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INTRODUCTION 
The major legal issues raised by this appeal are: (1) whether, under the doctrine of 
merger, the parties' written deeds extinguished any alleged oral contracts and rendered 
inadmissible plaintiffs' parol evidence of such contracts, (2) whether plaintiffs' claimed 
oral contracts are enforceable under the statute of frauds, and (3) whether plaintiffs' 
claims are barred by the four-year statute of limitations. A holding for the Warrs on any 
one of these issues is sufficient to bar plaintiffs' claims in their entirety and as a matter of 
law. Additional issues include (4) whether plaintiffs Wayne and Miriam Lewis have 
privity of contract with the Warrs, and (5) whether the trial court awarded plaintiffs 
excessive water rights. 
The trial court determined that the parties entered into an oral contract for 
conveyance of the Warrs' Irrigation Water as part of the purchase of plaintiffs' lots. R. 
955 at 146. In an effort to support this finding, plaintiffs have re-argued in their brief 
much of the parol evidence that they submitted to the trial court. The Court should not be 
distracted from the legal issues presented in this appeal by plaintiffs' discussion of factual 
questions that are not at issue here. While the Warrs continue to deny the existence of an 
oral contract, they have not challenged the trial court's factual findings in this appeal.1 
Rather, the Warrs maintain that the trial court never should have speculated on this 
factual question, because plaintiffs' claims are barred as a matter of law regardless of the 
existence or non-existence of any oral contract they might claim. 
1
 Because the Warrs do not challenge the trial court's findings of fact in this appeal, they 
are not required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) to marshal the evidence in support of those 
findings. Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7,117 n.4, 994 P.2d 193 ("[T]he marshaling 
requirement applies only to challenges of factual findings, not to conclusions of law."). 
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The trial court erred by attempting to reach back six to thirteen years to ascertain the 
terms of oral representations allegedly made prior to plaintiffs' purchase of lots, where the 
parties have subsequently reduced their agreement to written contracts and have executed 
and recorded written deeds in performance of their agreement. The doctrine of merger, the 
parole evidence rule, the statute of frauds, and the statute of limitations were specifically 
designed to prevent trial courts from jeopardizing litigants' real property rights upon 
doubtful factual determinations such as the one made by the trial court below. The courts 
and the Legislature have established these principles as a legal framework within which 
courts must resolve real property disputes without resorting to unreliable factual inquiries 
as to who said what at some time six to thirteen years in the past. 
Unfortunately, the trial judge ignored this legal framework and instead ordered the 
distribution of the Warrs' water rights based on his own finding of oral contract and his 
own notion of the equities. As a matter of law, however, any oral contract found by the 
trial court is unenforceable without additional findings to take the contract out of the 
doctrine of merger, the parol evidence rule, the statute of frauds, and the statute of 
limitations. The trial court made none of these required findings, because there was no 
evidence to support such findings. The trial court nevertheless ordered specific 
performance of the oral contract it believed it had found. By ignoring the requirements of 
the law, the trial court's judgment does serious violence to the legal protections of property 
rights erected by this Court. There is nothing to distinguish this case from the Court's 
established precedents barring claims under the doctrine of merger, the parol evidence rule, 
the statute of frauds, and the statute of limitations. Therefore, any affirmance of the trial 
1489614 2 
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weakening or eliminating these established legal protections, and placing property rijr lis 
instead within the discretionary fact-finding powers of the State's trial judges, i he W ans 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMED ORAL CONTRACTS ARE MERGED AND 
EXTINGUISHED IN THE PARTIES' WARRANTY DEEDS 
Plaintiffs seek to avoid the extinguishment of their claii i is 1 indei the docti ine of 
merger by arguing that this issue was not properly raised before the trial court and that their 
alleged oral terms for conveying title to the Irrigation Water were collateral to the convey-
raised before the trial court, w Inch ruled on this issue and thereby preserved it for appeal. 
Further, the collateral rights exception does not apply to contract terms relating to title. 
The rule for preservation of an issue for appellate review, as recited by plaintiffs, is 
that "a trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue." Badger v. Brooklyn 
there can be no question that the trial court was afforded an opportunity to rule on the 
merger doctrine because in fact it did rule on this issue from the bench and again in its 
Jik i^ i i icn l , ill !"IlliIIiiinji1" (ciToiieouslvl lh<il llie merger (Inch me did in nil apply because tlic pan lies 
did not intend their deeds to be an integration of their contracts. R. 955 at 147; R. 920. 
Plaintiffs cite Badger for the proposition that an issue must be raised in a timely 
148961.4 3 
an opportunity to rule on it. Appellants' Br. at 22 n.8, citing Badger, 966 P.2d at 847. 
These requirements obviously apply in cases like Badger where a party is appealing an 
issue not ruled upon in the forum below, but there is no need to prove that the court had an 
opportunity to rule on an issue when the court has actually ruled on it. Moreover, the 
Warrs specifically raised the merger doctrine in connection with their timely and 
continuing objection to plaintiffs' introduction of parol evidence. R. 953 at 34. They 
discussed the doctrine again in their closing argument, and supported their argument by 
citation to authority.2 R. 955 at 118-23 citing Dubrowsky v. Isbell, 740 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1987). Although this issue might have been more fully briefed at an earlier point in the 
litigation, this Court has repeatedly held that an issue is preserved for appeal, even if the 
issue was not raised until after the trial, where the trial court considers and rules on the 
merits of the issue. See State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993); State v. Belgard, 
830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991); State 
v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991). Where the issue is raised at trial and ruled 
upon by the trial court there can be no question that it was adequately preserved. 
B. The Oral Terms Alleged by Plaintiffs Are Not Collateral to the 
Conveyance of Title 
Plaintiffs seek to avoid the extinguishment of their claims under the merger doctrine 
2
 The Warrs' also offered to provide the trial court with additional briefing on this issue, 
but the court refused this briefing and ruled on its own understanding of the merger doc-
trine. R. 955 at 119, 145-46. Further, as plaintiffs acknowledge, the substance of the mer-
ger doctrine was raised in connection with the parol evidence rule in the Warrs' pre-trial 
brief and opening arguments, where the Warrs argued that the deeds constituted the final 
agreement between the parties as a matter of law. R. 702-03; R. 953 at 6-7. Because the 
Warrs' argument under the merger doctrine is purely legal, there can have been no preju-
dice to the plaintiffs from the Court's consideration of the issue after the evidence was 
closed. 
148961.4 4 
lots in the written warranty deeds. See Appellees' Br. at 22-25. Plaintiffs' claim is 
inconsistent with their own argument, maintained throughout this litigation, that the lots 
consideration for the warranty deeds was intended to pay for title to both the lots and the 
Irrigation Water. See R. 38-39, 150, 569, 682, 841, 935. Moreover, plaintiffs' claims do 
i i : it fit * ithin the collateral i iglits exception because the oral terms they allege relate to title 
and the parties' deeds directly address the si lbject c f wat : i i igl its Plaintiffs distoi t the • lav 
of collateral terms in an attempt to make their claims fit within this exception. 
1
 As a Matter of Law, Terms Relating k\ I "it le Are Not Collateral 
The collateral rights exception does not apply to contract terms relating to title 
because such terms are, as a matter of law, central to the conveyance of title in the deeds 
rather than collateral, v,,;./,, ..
 lr M-, «... . . . , . . MM- \xy ":> "he 
law is well-established in this regard: 
"The question of whether a specific term is or is not collateral, and hence 
whether the term will or will not merge into the deed, is determined by the 
intent of the parties." . . . However. Utah courts need not look to the parties' 
intent on issues relating to title and encumbrances because such issues "relate 
to the same subject matter as does the deed." 
hi (emphasis added) (quoting Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 793 (Utah 1986). Thus 
..: „v ... -a panics mia.: 
irrelevant after delivery and acceptance of the deed" and "the merger doctrine "h cuiiau.^ 
rights exception . . . does not apply." Id (emphasis added); see also Dansic w Hi-Couicn 
Estates Homeowners A*, n, i^99l J I " 62,1J 21, 98 > l ' 2d 30; Embassy (*roup, Inc v. h 
148961.4 5 
865 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d at 793. Because 
plaintiffs' claimed oral contracts relate to title in the Warrs' Irrigation Water, such 
contracts, to the extent they ever existed, are merged and extinguished by the parties' deeds 
as a matter of law. 
2. The Warranty Deeds Explicitly Address the Subject of Water 
Even if the collateral rights exception could be applied to terms relating to title, the 
warranty deeds in this case indicate that title to water was not collateral to the title to 
plaintiffs' lots. The warranty deeds given to each plaintiff describe all water rights 
associated with the lots, and thereby manifest plainly that the subject of water rights was 
not collateral to sale of the lots. For example, when plaintiffs Freddie and Karen Martinez 
bought Lot 1 from the Warrs, the Warrs had already installed a well on Lot 1 and applied to 
the State Engineer for certification of their water rights. R. 670.3 The warranty deed for 
Lot 1 therefore conveys the water right together with the lot: 
LOT 1, ROCKY TOP SUBDIVISION, A SUBDIVISION OF TOOELE 
COUNTY, according to the official plat thereof, recorded in the office of the 
County Recorder of Tooele County, Utah. TOGETHER WITH WATER 
RIGHT APPLICATION NO. 15-3242 (A61781) & 8" well, filed with the 
State of Utah. 
Tr. Ex. 62, (copy attached to Appellants' Br. at App. C). Thus, when the parties intended a 
conveyance of water rights, they described those rights on the deed itself. 
Further, all of the plaintiffs' warranty deeds incorporate the official plat, which 
clearly provides: "Lot purchasers are responsible for . . . on-lot wells." Tr. Ex. 17 (copies 
This, incidentally, explains why the Warrs advertised the sale of the Martinez' lot, 
unlike the other lots, with "water, utilities." See Appellees' Br. at 1-2, 6. This fact was 
acknowledged by stipulation of the parties, R. 670, and by the Martinez in their trial 
testimony. R. 953 at 194-95, R. 954 at 15-16. 
148961.4 6 
attacl led to \ppellants . . -
(Warranty Deeds) (copies attached to Appellants' Br. as App C), This statem i" 
constitutes an explicit limitation on the Warrs' responsibility to provide water to the lots. 
This limitation is not collateral to the rights conveyed in the warranty deeds, but is a part of 
'ill'H <f( *hds themselves J M ' I V H 1 T """ M 'hni im V< < ^ ./W" nnofhhih h1 < iui^^tl 
Oil Co., 471 P.2d 148, 149-50 (Utah 1970) ("When lands are granted according to an 
official plat of a survey, the plat itself, w it! I all its notes, lines, descriptions and landmarks, 
I ) r r n 1 1 1 r s , i < , 1 1 1 1 1 m II i i 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 i" i 111 II 1 1 1 111 r i II 11 \ \ \ 1 1 1 1 II i II II I \ l s I i n i n 11 \ < ; \ i • 111 , i 1 1 M I I I * II i 
descriptive features were written out on the face of the deed or grant itself"). 
** Plaintiffs' Argument Distorts the Law of Collateral Terms 
• - ni.nr r fi\ Norton '^ • distor It tl ie la ( \ in ai i attei i ipt t ::> in :t l a l :e the ^ollat • • ' i 
exception applicable to their claims. Plaintiffs incorrectly claim that contract terms arc 
collateral (a) where performance of the terms is intended to take place after conveyance of 
These assertions are not supported by the decisions of this Court, and manifest the plain-
tiffs9 plain misunderstanding of the doctrine of merger and the collateral rights exception. 
a. Where "I 'erms II elat e III: ci I itl e. tlr e I im e • ci f I "  E i fci t man ;:  e lis 
Immaterial 
Plaintiffs rely on Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977), for the proposition 
ill,in ui'iiliiid tail! i JiiiuM In tlaiiial i iill.iin'idl in ilini dci. 11 s wlicit: lln; pei lonuaiice ul 
those terms is intended to take place at some time after the delivery of the deed. Appellees' 
Br. at 24. Plaintiffs further claim that "in Dansie v Ili-Cowwy Estates Homeowners 
k\ //,,9S7 V.2c * .4,1 i , .:.. -• .....i reiteratea u.. ioregoing standard. -1-
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tiffs materially misrepresent the Court's holding in Dansie and the current state of the law. 
The Dansie Court addressed the Stubbs decision but did not "reiterate" it. Rather, in 
language omitted from the plaintiffs' brief, the Dansie Court pointed out that years earlier, 
it had clarified and corrected the erroneous standard set forth in Stubbs. See Dansie, 1999 
UT 62, fflf 20-21, 987 P.2d 30 (copy attached to Addendum as App. A). In reality, this 
Court in Dansie expressly rejected the same argument plaintiffs make here: 
The Association argues that under Stubbs the language of the 1973 Contract 
is not extinguished by the later deeds because the "1973 Contract requires the 
buyers to become members of the Homeowners Association at some point 
after the signing of the Contract. . . , it contemplates performance after the 
delivery of the deed, and constitutes a collateral agreement." 
However, nearly a decade after Stubbs, this court clarified the collateral 
rights standard, holding that "covenants relating to title and encumbrances 
are not considered to be collateral because they relate to the same subject 
matter as does the deed." Secor [v. Knight], 716 P.2d 790, 793 (Utah 1986) 
(citation omitted). The contract language relied on by the Association here is 
clearly a "covenant[ ] related to title and [an] encumbrance[ ]" upon the title 
to the Property. 
Id. (emphasis added). Because the disputed terms related to title, the Court held as a matter 
of law that they were not collateral but were merged in the parties' deeds. Id. The Court's 
decisions in Secor and Dansie make it clear that terms relating to title in real property are 
not collateral to the deeds by which the property is conveyed, regardless of when 
performance of those terms is intended to take place. 
b. Terms Omitted from the Deed Are Not Collateral 
Plaintiffs argue that because the warranty deeds do not mention the Irrigation Water, 
title to the Irrigation Water must, "by definition," be a different subject matter than the title 
to their lots, and therefore collateral. Appellees' Br. at 24, quoting Dansie, 716 P.2d at 
792. Plaintiffs seriously misconstrue the holding of Dansie. The "subject matter" referred 
148961.4 8 
to in Dansie is the subject of " title i n i< i encumbrances" generally,, not just the n-.u io the 
particular interests described in the dec/ - property 11 :)t mentioned in the -
definition" a different subject matter and therefore collateral to the conveyance in the deed, 
then the collateral rights exception would swallow up the doctrine of merger, effectively 
i Iiiiiiiii iliiit" ill Tin iii inp1! dm Www mil .iiiscs when 111 Irnf i run r\ • .mm'thin;1 diffi nut 
than the buyer thought it was buying or the seller thought it was selling. If a subject were 
deemed to be collateral whenever it was left out of the deed, this exception would apply in 
Water is not described in the deeds means that it was not conveyed, not that it is collateral 
to the sale of the lots. 
Ilie Parol Evidence Ruk < ,ed and 
Extinguished Terms 
~" *ie plaintiffs' alleged oral contracts are subject to the doctrine of merger, then any 
evidence ,A auc.\ contracts proffered le purpose of contradicting me deedb r^.v,-i... 
l i k e w i - *"/• c\c} J - i - - . • -,(1. *-,, • ...t ,!: ,nnli.* ' ' M 
merger doctrine in conjunction with the parol evidence rule to exclude parol evidence of 
contracts—whether written or oral- offered for the purpose of contradicting the terms of 
Parol evidence of prior terms is inadmissible to contradict a valid, written deed, 
because the deed represents the parties n i\u\ L integrated agreement as a matter of law. See 
v the sense of being a separate interest in real property, the Irrigation Water is of course 
"a different subject matter" than the lots. It is for this reason that the Irrigation Water must 
also be purchased by a separate agreement and paid for with separate considers:< ^ 
148961.4 9 
inadmissible for the reason that such terms are merged in the deeds and the existence of 
such merged terms is irrelevant to the parties' rights under the deed. See Reese Howell, 
158 P. at 157 ("[T]he [trial] court did not err in rejecting appellant's offer of proof [of prior 
contracts] upon the ground that it was immaterial, if for no other reason." (emphasis 
added)); Maynard v. Wharton, 912 P.2d at 450 ("[T]he parties' intent regarding Lot 15 [as 
set forth in a prior agreement] is irrelevant after delivery and acceptance of the deed." 
(emphasis added)). The trial court's finding that the deeds were not integrated is contrary 
to settled law, and the court therefore erred by admitting and relying on plaintiffs' parol 
evidence of contrary terms over the Warrs' objection. 
D. The Doctrine of Merger Must Be Strictly Enforced 
The doctrine of merger must be rigorously maintained to preserve the integrity of 
written deeds and to encourage the diligence of the parties. Secor, 716 P.2d at 795. If in 
fact the plaintiffs believed that they should have acquired title to the Warrs' Irrigation 
Water with the purchase of their lots, it was their duty to see that a covenant to that effect 
was included in the deeds they purchased. Id. This Court has declared: "in the sales of 
land, the law remits the party to his covenants in his deed; if . . . the party has not taken the 
precaution to secure himself by covenants, he has no remedy for his money, even on failure 
of title." Reese Howell Co., 158 P. at 689. The State's entire system of recorded 
conveyances depends on the reliability and integrity of recorded deeds. The Court should 
not permit that integrity to be compromised by plaintiffs' subsequent allegations of 
additional oral terms contrary to the terms accepted and recorded in their written deeds. 
148961.4 10 
IL PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
As plaintiffs acknowledge, a claimant seeking to avoid the statute of frauds under 
the theory of part performance must show acts of part performance done in reliance on the 
alleged oral contract such that "(a) they would not have been performed had the contract 
not existed, and (b) the failure to perform on the part of the promissor would result in fraud 
on the performer who relied, since damages would be inadequate." Martin v. Scholl, 678 
P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983) (copy attached to Addendum as App. B) (quoted in Appellees' 
Br. at 28). Plaintiffs do not even argue that damages would be inadequate to compensate 
their alleged losses, and they utterly fail to show any action on their part that would not 
have been performed absent the oral contract they allege. 
A. Plaintiffs Do Not Even Address the Requirement of Showing Their 
Eligibility for an Equitable Remedy 
It is well-established that there can be no equitable award of specific performance 
without some showing that the plaintiffs' reliance on the oral promises of the defendant 
resulted in substantial losses, and that damages would be inadequate to compensate their 
loss. See Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d at 275-76 and cases cited therein. This is because the 
doctrine of part performance is based on the equitable theory of estoppel and therefore det-
rimental reliance must be shown. Id. (quoting In re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 
1954)). Plaintiffs acknowledge this requirement, but having acknowledged it, they have 
failed to address it both in their evidence before the trial court and in their brief on appeal. 
See Appellees' Br. at 28 (quoting Martin at 275). As previously explained, plaintiffs here 
have proved no losses resulting from the purchase of their lots, which were priced based on 
an appraisal of the land without water rights. R. 353-55; R. 674-75. Nor have plaintiffs 
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explained why damages would be inadequate to remedy any losses they might claim. See 
Appellants' Br. at 35-37. The trial court's lengthy findings of fact are likewise silent on 
this issue, and it is not addressed in the Judgment. This omission is fatal. Plaintiffs cannot 
recover under the doctrine of part performance without some showing of substantial loss. 
B. Plaintiffs Have Utterly Failed to Show Any Act of Reliance Exclusively 
Referable to the Oral Contracts They Allege 
Even if the plaintiffs could show the kind of losses that would qualify them for the 
equitable remedy they seek, they do not show that such losses were the result of acts of 
reliance that can be explained only by reference to the oral contract they claim. In other 
words, they cannot satisfy the requirement of "exclusive referability." 
1. Plaintiffs' Alleged Acts of Reliance Are Not Exclusively 
Referable to Any Promise for Free Irrigation Water 
Plaintiffs show no act of part performance done in reliance on their alleged oral 
contracts that would not have been performed had the contracts not existed. The trial 
court found that the plaintiffs had purchased their lots in reliance on the Warrs' alleged 
promise that they would not be charged for Irrigation Water. However, the Warrs have 
shown that the plaintiffs purchased lots pursuant to their written contracts, not in the 
performance of unwritten agreements. See Appellants' Br. at 28. The Warrs also have 
shown that many people, including plaintiffs Wayne and Miriam Lewis, have purchased 
lots without any expectation of Irrigation Water. Plaintiffs do not and cannot deny that 
the purchase of their lots can be explained without reference to the Irrigation Water. This 
act is therefore insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute part performance in circum-
vention of the statute of frauds. See Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d at 278-79 (exclusive 
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referability is a question of law); see also Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 79-80 
(Utah 1982); Baugh v. Logan City, 495 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah 1972). 
In their brief, plaintiffs also assert that they improved their lots by building homes 
and, in the case of three plaintiffs, a water distribution pipeline in reliance on oral contracts 
with the Warrs for free Irrigation Water. See Appellees' Br. at 28. The trial court did not 
find, nor could it reasonably have found, that these acts were done in reliance on the 
alleged contract for free Irrigation Water; therefore plaintiffs' claims of reliance are 
entitled to no deference. 
Further, there are at least three reasons why plaintiffs' improvements cannot 
establish part performance. First, the lot improvements were not required by the parties' 
alleged agreement and therefore were not done in performance or part performance of the 
alleged oral contracts. See Martin, 678 P.2d at 275 and sources cited therein. Second, 
plaintiffs' improvements to the lots are not exclusively referable to the alleged contracts. 
For instance, the homes plaintiffs built are not dependent on the Irrigation Water, but are 
fully supplied with culinary water by on-lot wells, consistent with the general practice in 
the area. R. 633, 667-74. The fact that all but one of the plaintiffs have built homes 
without Irrigation Water and have comfortably occupied those homes for several years, see 
R. 663, 667-74, suggests that this act was not dependent on an expectation of Irrigation 
Water and therefore cannot be exclusively referable to the oral contracts plaintiffs allege. 
Likewise, the plaintiffs' participation in the construction of the distribution pipeline is 
equally consistent with the Warrs' understanding that the lot owners intended to purchase 
Irrigation Water, and is not exclusively referable to the claimed contracts. Finally, the de 
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minimus participation of the three plaintiffs who helped with construction of the water line 
does not constitute "significant" reliance,5 and could not serve as part performance for the 
other seven plaintiffs, even if it otherwise qualified as part performance. 
Plaintiffs make no effort to show how any of their acts of alleged reliance are 
exclusively referable to the alleged promise that they would be given Irrigation Water free 
of charge. Plaintiffs claim that they would not have purchased lots or built improvements 
unless they believed they would be given free Irrigation Water with the lots, but there is 
nothing about the plaintiffs' actions themselves that manifests any such understanding.6 As 
this Court has explained, the doctrine of part performance is an "acts-oriented rather than a 
word-oriented evidentiary requirement," and "equity declines to act on words . . . unless 
the words are confirmed and illuminated by deeds." Martin, 678 P.2d at 275, 277. In this 
case, the plaintiffs are long on after-the-fact words, but exceedingly short on any meaning-
ful deeds. 
2. Plaintiffs Cannot Avoid the Requirement of Showing Acts 
Exclusively Referable to the Oral Contracts They Allege 
Because plaintiffs cannot show any act exclusively referable to the oral contracts 
they allege, they seek to dispense with this requirement by arguing that it is "satisfied" by 
independent evidence of the contract. Appellees' Br. at 29. Plaintiffs' argument mis-
represents the law of part performance as set forth by this Court in Martin v. Scholh 
"[WJhere either independent acts which prove the contract can be found, or an admission 
5
 The three plaintiffs who helped with the line have stipulated that their contributions 
were $300 or $600 of the total cost, which was between $6,000 and $10,000. R. 668. 
6
 It is undisputed, of course, that the amount the plaintiffs paid for their lots was based on 
an appraisal of the land without irrigation water. R. 353-55; R. 674-75. Thus, while 
plaintiffs may claim they would never have purchased lots without the Irrigation Water, it 
is clear that what they paid for was exactly that. 
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of the contract is present, the requirement of exclusive referability may be relaxed." 678 
P.2d at 278 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs cite this language, but overstate its effect by 
claiming that their independent evidence "satisfied" the requirement of exclusive 
referability. Appellees' Br. at 29. The Martin case demonstrates that the evidentiary 
standard for part performance is more stringent than plaintiffs would have the Court 
believe, and demands more compelling evidence than plaintiffs can provide. 
In Martin, the trial court found that the claimants' independent evidence had shown 
the existence of an oral contract. 678 P.2d at 278. The Utah Supreme Court did not 
question this finding of fact, but nevertheless reversed the district court as a matter of law 
because the acts of reliance urged by the plaintiff were not exclusively referable to the 
alleged contract, but could be explained on other grounds. Id. at 279. This Court held that 
"the necessity of showing acts of part performance which were exclusively referable to the 
claimed agreement remain[ed] vital," in spite of the trial court's finding of oral contract, 
because the evidence of the contract was not undisputed, i.e., "the evidence of the oral 
contract. . . required the judge to weigh the credibility of Martin's witnesses against 
witnesses for the [defendants] who vigorously disputed the existence of an oral contract." 
Id. The trial court in the instant case found the existence of an oral contract by "beyond a 
preponderance of the evidence," R. 921, but the Martin Court stated that the exclusive 
referability requirement cannot be relaxed even where the trial court finds the existence of 
the contract is proved by clear and convincing evidence. 678 P.2d at 280 n. 1. 
The rule established by Martin is that the exclusive referability requirement may be 
"relaxed where there [is] no evidentiary concern regarding the existence of a contract," but 
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where the contract is disputed, as it is here, the requirement remains vital. Id. at 279 (em-
phasis added). Plaintiffs have shown no acts of reliance that can be explained only by re-
ference to the oral contract they allege. Their claim of part performance must therefore fail. 
Even where the oral contract is undisputed, the requirement of showing acts exclu-
sively referable to the contract is not "satisfied," but merely "relaxed." In McDonald v. 
Barton Bros. Investment Corp., Inc., 631 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981), the defendant, a property 
purchaser, admitted that he had entered into the oral agreement claimed by the seller, but 
this agreement was not included by covenant in the written purchase agreement. Id. at 852. 
The trial court held that the purchaser was bound under the doctrine of part performance, 
but this Court reversed. The court stated: 
The controlling issue on . . . appeal is not whether [the] oral contract was 
proved by clear and convincing evidence,.. . but whether the alleged acts of 
part performance were themselves referable to and done in pursuance of that 
contract. If the acts relied on were not done in the execution of the oral 
contract but can be explained on another ground, they are insufficient to 
remove the bar of the statute of frauds, and the contract is unenforceable. 
Id. at 853 (emphasis added). The Court reversed the trial court's finding of part 
performance because the acts of alleged reliance were not exclusively referable to the par-
ties' oral contract. Id. Plaintiffs in this case cannot avoid the requirement of demonstrating 
acts exclusively referable to the oral contracts they allege. Their failure to do so means that 
their alleged oral contracts are barred by the statute of frauds and are unenforceable. 
7
 A "relaxed" standard might require plaintiffs to show acts of part performance that are 
"not readily explainable" or "not reasonably explicable" on some ground other than the 
alleged oral contract. See Martin, 678 P.2d at 280. The acts of supposed reliance under-
taken by the plaintiffs are readily explainable on the ground that the Warrs intended to sell 
the Irrigation Water to the plaintiffs, and in fact provide no evidence whatever that the 
water was to be given free of charge. 
148961.4 16 
3. Plaintiffs' "Independent Evidence" Is Not Compelling 
Even if the requirement of exclusive referability could be "satisfied," the 
independent evidence put forward by the plaintiffs falls far below the "high evidentiary 
standard" required for the operation of the part performance doctrine in circumvention of 
the statute of frauds. Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d at 276 (citing Van Natta v. Heywood, 195 
P. 192, 194 (Utah 1920)). As discussed in the Warrs' opening brief, the independent 
evidence relied on by the trial court is equivocal at best. See Appellants' Br. at 29-35. It 
shows only that the Warrs intended to develop the Irrigation Water for use on the Erda 
Farm and in the Subdivision and documents the Warrs' efforts to accomplish this purpose. 
Again, this is not disputed. The only dispute in this case is whether the Irrigation Water 
Although the Warrs have not challenged the trial court's factual findings in this appeal, 
the Warrs nevertheless take issue with the plaintiffs' characterization of the evidence in 
their brief. For example, plaintiffs falsely claim that the Warrs filed a Change Application 
in 1983 to change the place of use of the Irrigation Water to the Subdivision to facilitate 
development of the Subdivision. Appellees' Br. at 5. However, the record shows that the 
Warrs changed the place of use to the entire 110-acre Erda Farm, not just the Subdivision, 
which was later located on a portion of the Farm. See R. 677; Tr. Ex. 3 (copy attached to 
Appellants' Br. at App. G). The Subdivision was not even created until 1985, and the 
Warrs had no intention of subdividing their property in 1983. R. 676; Tr. Ex. 15 (copy 
attached to Appellants' Br. at App. F); R. 954 at 68. Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestion, the 
Warrs are not obliged under the terms of their Change Application or subsequent Appli-
cations for Extensions to use any portion of the Irrigation Water on the plaintiffs' lots. 
Plaintiffs also quote Hazel Warr's testimony out of context to suggest unfairly that 
she admitted to perjury while on the witness stand. Appellees' Br. at 12. Mrs. Warrs' 
statement, "I suppose I'm perjured," was not, as plaintiffs' insinuate, an explanation of her 
testimony, but a reaction to plaintiffs' counsel's mischaracterization of her Affidavit in the 
Bleazard litigation. Counsel insisted that the Affidavit represented that the Irrigation Water 
was sold with the lots. R. 954 at 95 (copy attached to Addendum as App C). Mrs. Wan-
disagreed, but admitted that, to the extent the Affidavit meant what plaintiffs' counsel said 
it meant, her prior testimony in the Affidavit was false. Id. Read in context, however, Mrs. 
Warr's testimony makes it clear that she did not understand the Affidavit this way when 
she signed it, but understood it to say only that lot purchasers were told they would be 
provided with Irrigation Water for their purchase. Id. at 95-97. 
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was promised to lot purchasers free of charge. The only evidence of such promises is the 
plaintiffs' own testimonies, which themselves were often inconclusive.9 At any rate, the 
plaintiffs' self-serving testimonies are not the kind of "independent evidence" that can 
satisfy the "high evidentiary standard" required to circumvent the statute of frauds. 
C. Hazel Warr Did Not Legally Authorize Anyone to Sell Her Interest in 
the Irrigation Water 
Plaintiffs argue that Hazel Warr promised them Irrigation Water, and that even if 
she didn't, she should be bound under principles of agency or estoppel by the alleged 
statements of her husband or her son. Appellees' Br. at 32. Plaintiffs' claims are 
unsupported by the record or the law. 
The record cited by plaintiffs in their brief shows that only three plaintiffs—Fred 
Martinez, Karen Martinez, and Wayne Reynolds—even claim to have received promises 
from Hazel. Appellees' Br. at 32 citing R. 953 at 79-80,195-96; R. 954 at 6-9, 27, 45-46, 
50. Plaintiffs do not provide any evidence from the record that Hazel ever promised to 
provide free Irrigation Water to the other seven plaintiffs with their lots. Id.10 
Because they can find no evidence that Hazel Warr ever promised free Irrigation 
Water to the remaining plaintiffs, plaintiffs claim in the alternative that Hazel Warr is liable 
under the principles of agency and estoppel for promises allegedly made by Edward Warr 
or by the Warrs' estranged son, Howard Warr. Appellees' Br. at 33-35. Plaintiffs cite no 
9
 For example, Clifford Ruben testified: "We just thought the water came with the deed 
itself." Q: "Is that what you were told?" A: "No, we just assumed that." R. 953 at 120 
(emphasis added). Loralee Crittenden likewise testified: "They never did say a price or 
anything at that time. That's why we made an assumption that water went with it." R. 
954 at 22 (emphasis added). 
10
 Plaintiffs cite the testimony of Sandy Spears, but her testimony when questioned as to 
who had promised her Irrigation Water was only: "You know, I'm not sure. I think it 
was just in the conversation about the—I don't recall which one it was." R. 953 at 80. 
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case law in support of these theories, but rely on provisions of the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency, §§8 and 8B. Whatever the general rules of agency and estoppel may be, the Utah 
Legislature has made it clear, and this Court has expressly held, that where the underlying 
transaction is one that must normally be reduced to writing under the statute of frauds, any 
agent purporting to act on behalf of a seller must likewise be authorized in writing. Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-5-1; Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78-79 (Utah 1982). Plaintiffs can 
produce no writing authorizing either Edward Warr or Howard Warr to sell Hazel Warr's 
interest in the Irrigation Water. Their claims of reliance on the alleged promises of these 
persons are therefore incapable of conveying Hazel Warr's interest in the Irrigation Water. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court properly concluded that the statute of limitations 
was tolled under the "misleading conduct" and "exceptional circumstances" exceptions 
until the plaintiffs' discovery of their cause of action in late 1995. Appellees' Br. at 35. 
The trial court reached no such conclusion, but held only that the plaintiffs had timely 
brought their cause of action after the discovery of their claims. R. 955 at 148; R. 920. 
Further, there is no evidence of any such misleading conduct or exceptional circumstances. 
A. Plaintiffs Do Not Support Their Claims from the Record 
Although the trial court found no misleading conduct or exceptional circumstances 
in this case, plaintiffs attempt to shore up the trial court's Judgment by alleging it in their 
brief. See Appellees' Br. at 36-38. However, the plaintiffs' allegations are unsupported by 
any citation to the record, as required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7) & (e). Id. The Court 
therefore has no obligation to address these allegations and may rule as a matter of law that 
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the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. See MacKay v. Hardy, 973 
P.2d 941, 948 n.9 (Utah 1998) and cases cited therein. 
B. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged Facts Sufficient to Toll the Statute 
But even if the Court should decide to address plaintiffs' claims of misleading con-
duct or exceptional circumstances, plaintiffs' assertions are insufficient to justify a tolling 
of the statute of limitations under these exceptions because they do not show (i) that plain-
tiffs exercised due diligence to discover their cause of action within the statutory period, 
(ii) that the Warrs undertook any affirmative acts of concealment, or (iii) that application of 
the statute of limitations would be irrational or unjust in the present circumstances. 
1. Plaintiffs Failed to Exercise Due Diligence 
As a pre-requisite to a tolling of the statute of limitations under either the misleading 
conduct or the exceptional circumstances versions of the discovery rule, plaintiffs must 
show that, by exercise of "due diligence," they "could not reasonably have discovered the 
facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within" the statutory 
limitations period. Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 52, 55 (Utah 1996) (citations 
omitted). Plaintiffs made no effort to discover their claims within the statutory period. 
Plaintiffs allege no facts that would have prevented them from examining their deeds 
within the statutory period and determining that the Irrigation Water was neither conveyed 
nor promised in the deeds. "[Djiligence involves a duty on the part of both parties to make 
certain that their agreements have in fact been fully included in the final document." Secor, 
716 P.2d at 794 (emphasis added). If the plaintiffs truly believed that they were promised 
Irrigation Water with the purchase of their lots, it was their duty to exercise at least this 
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minimal degree of diligence. 
2. Plaintiffs Allege No Affirmative Acts of Concealment 
Plaintiffs argue that they did not discover their cause of action until 1995 because of 
the Warrs' "misleading conduct," Appellees' Br. at 35-37, but they allege no act on the part 
of the Warrs that would suffice to toll the statute of limitations under the fraudulent 
concealment exception. In order to invoke this exception, plaintiffs must "allege[ ] and 
make[ ] out a prima facie case that a defendant has taken affirmative steps to conceal the 
plaintiffs' cause of action." Berenda, 914 P.2d at 50 (emphasis added). Even plaintiffs' 
unsupported assertions do not show any action by the Warrs that could reasonably mislead 
the plaintiffs or conceal the facts on which their action is based. 
The only misleading conduct plaintiffs allege was that the Warrs told them that they 
intended to provide the water "as soon as delivery became possible," that "the water could 
not yet be delivered because of the pending litigation with Bleazard and various problems 
with the pipeline," and that "deeds were being prepared." Appellees' Br. at 36. Each of 
these supposedly "misleading statements" was actually true, and each one has been 
stipulated to by the parties. See R. 680 (Warrs intended to provide the Irrigation Water for 
sale to lot owners if and when it became available); R. 665 (Warrs provided plaintiffs with 
opportunity to purchase Irrigation Water after title was secured and delivery became 
possible); R. 677, 668 (capacity of Railroad Pipeline is inadequate to deliver Irrigation 
Water); R. 673, 667 (Bleazard prevented conveyance of water until 1993); R. 665 (Warrs 
prepared quit-claim deeds in 1993 for sale of Irrigation Water). Further, there is nothing 
about any of these statements that could reasonably mislead the plaintiffs into thinking that 
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the Irrigation Water would be given to them free of charge. 
Other than these admittedly true statements, plaintiffs allege as misleading conduct 
only that "the Warrs never indicated to the Plaintiffs tha t . . . the Plaintiffs would be 
charged an additional fee for the water." Appellees' Br. at 37. There is nothing misleading 
about the Warrs' silence on this point, since there is no evidence that any of the plaintiffs 
ever asked the Warrs, either before or after the sale of the lots, whether they would be 
charged for Irrigation Water. The Warrs' silence under these circumstances cannot be 
construed as the taking of "affirmative steps to conceal the plaintiffs' cause of action." 
Berenda, 914 ?.2d at 50. 
3. Plaintiffs Do Not Show Any Exceptional Circumstance 
Under the exceptional circumstances exception, plaintiffs must show "that the 
application of the statute of limitations would be irrational or unjust." Burkholz v. Joyce, 
972 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Utah 1998). To determine this, the Court "will apply a balancing test 
to weigh 'the hardship imposed on the claimant by the application of the statute of 
limitations against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the passage of time.'" 
Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20,1f 11, 998 P.2d 262 (citations omitted). The factors the Court 
will consider in this balancing test include: "whether the defendant's problems caused by 
the passage of time are greater than the plaintiffs . . . and whether the claim has aged to the 
point that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be found, and the parties cannot 
remember basic events." Sevy v. Security Title, 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995). In this 
case the balance favors the Warrs. 
The only hardship plaintiffs claim is that they would lose their case against the 
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Warrs if the statute of limitations is applied. Appellees5 Br. at 39. But this is the result in 
every instance where the statute of limitations is applied, and is not the kind of "exception-
al circumstance" that requires the statute to be tolled. The Warrs, on the other hand, have 
suffered severe prejudice as a result of plaintiffs' delay in bringing their cause of action. 
Edward Warr, who was the person principally involved in the sale of the lots, R. 73, suf-
fered the onslaught of heart disease and diabetes in the years subsequent to the sale of these 
lots, and underwent a quadruple bypass heart surgery prior to the trial of this case. R. 689; 
R. 954 at 138, 149. In December of 2000, Mr. Warr passed away as a result of his illness. 
Mr. Warr's illness and old age affected his memory and prevented him from effectively 
testifying in his own defense during the trial. R. 954 at 138, 145-49. The trial court 
acknowledged that Edward Warr's testimony was unreliable because of his physical 
condition, and ultimately disregarded his testimony in its entirety. R. 954 at 150. It should 
be obvious that the defense is prejudiced where the testimony of its principal witness is 
disregarded by the court. Because the prejudice to the Warrs caused by plaintiffs' delay 
outweighs the harm to plaintiffs, the "exceptional circumstances" exception is inapplicable 
in this case and plaintiffs' claims are barred by the four-year statute of limitations. 
IV, THE LEWISES LACK THE PRIVITY OF CONTRACT NECESSARY FOR 
THEM TO BRING AN ACTION AGAINST THE WARRS 
Plaintiffs do not address any of the privity arguments asserted by the Warrs in their 
opening brief, except to state, in a conclusory fashion, that by virtue of the quit claim deed, 
"the [Crittendons'] claim for the water rights is now vested in the Lewises, and they are 
entitled to the irrigation water." Appellees' Br. at 39-40. However, there is no legal basis 
for the Lewises' claim, which is barred both by their lack of privity with the Warrs and by 
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their failure to set forth this subsequent transaction in a supplemental pleading. See 
Appellants' Br. at 41-44. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT REQUIRES THE WARRS TO 
CONVEY AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF WATER 
In an attempt to increase their already unfair taking of the Warrs' Irrigation Water, 
plaintiffs claim that they are each entitled to a deed granting them .079 cfs of water. Ap-
pellees' Br. at 40. Plaintiffs ignore the fact that the Rose Spring is subject to seasonal fluc-
tuations and drought conditions. The amount of water actually available to the Warrs from 
the flow of Rose Spring is probably insufficient to supply .079 cfs, and the Warrs' water 
right is limited to a percentage of that flow. See Appellants' Br. at 44-45. Plaintiffs simply 
claim, without citation to the record, that "[t]he record plainly established that the Plaintiffs 
were promised sufficient water to irrigate five acres,"11 and that .079 cfs is required for this 
purpose. Appellees' Br. at 40. However, the record actually shows that plaintiffs can 
claim no more than 7.5% of the Warrs' water right, up to a maximum of .075 cfs. 
Plaintiffs do not deny that .075 cfs of water is sufficient to irrigate 4.5 acres, and do 
not claim that any more than 4.5 acres of their lots is irrigible land. See id. Plaintiffs cite 
testimony of Vern Loveless indicating that .079 cfs would irrigate their lots, and attach the 
quit-claim deeds prepared by Mr. Loveless in 1993 for that amount. Id. at 40, Supp. App. 
at "A." However, plaintiffs omit the portion of Mr. Loveless' testimony explaining how he 
corrected those deeds the following year after determining that .079 cfs could not reason-
ably be used on the plaintiffs' lots and prepared new quit-claim deeds for 7.5% of the 
11
 Appellants' examination of the record on this point revealed only the testimony of 
Melvin Spears, who testified that the Warrs never told him how much irrigation water 
would be conveyed. R. 953 at 42. 
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Irrigation Water, up to a maximum of .075 cfs. See R. 954 at 185 (copy attached to 
Addendum as App. D); R. 954 at 185-86; Tr. Exs. 90, 92, 97, 98. 
The plaintiffs uniformly testified that they were never presented with quit-claim 
deeds until late 1995, by which time the 1993 deeds had indisputably been replaced by 
deeds conveying 7.5% of the Irrigation Water. R. 593 at 58-59, 101-102, 182-83, 204-05; 
R. 954 at 53. Every lot owner who acquired Irrigation Water from the Warrs was conveyed 
7.5%. R. 665-67; Tr. Exs. 97, 98, 108. This was also the amount prayed for in the plain-
tiffs' own Complaint, R. 34, and although he expressed some confusion as to what the 
actual percentage should be, Judge Young specifically ruled from the bench that the Warrs 
were to convey a percentage of their water sufficient to irrigate 4.5 acres of the plaintiffs' 
lots. See R. 955 at 145, 149-50. The Court should not countenance plaintiffs' avaricious 
and overreaching attempt to take more water than they can even use, and potentially more 
than the Warrs own. Any quit-claim deeds executed on behalf of plaintiffs should be 
limited to 7.5% of the Warrs' original water right. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and remand this case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the Warrs. 
The Complaint actually indicates that each plaintiffs "respective share" is "7.5 cfs." 
R. 34. This is of course is many times more water than the entire Rose Spring contains. 
Plaintiffs presumably mean 7.5 percent. 
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OPINIONBY: 
HOWE 
OPINION: 
[**31] HOWE, Chief Justice: 
[*P1] Plaintiff J. Rodney Dansie appeals from a 
judgment in this declaratory judgment action that his 
eighty acres of real property were subject to the 
covenants, conditions, and restrictions which had been 
imposed on an adjacent subdivision, the Hi-Country 
Estates Phase I Subdivision (the "Subdivision" or "Phase 
I"), and that his property was subject to assessments 
made by the defendant Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Association (the "Association"). 
[*P2] Dansie owns two forty-acre parcels of real 
property (collectively the "Property") located in 
southwest Salt Lake County, Utah. These parcels abut 
the Subdivision to the south and west; specifically, these 
parcels are described as the southwest quarter [***2] of 
the southwest quarter (the "westerly parcel") and the 
southeast quarter of the southwest quarter (the "easterly 
parcel") of section 5, township 4 south, range 2 west, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. Dansie also owns two lots 
within the Subdivision—lots 43 and 51. 
[*P3] 
In 1970, Gerald H. Bagley, Charles Lewton, and 
Keith Spencer (the "developers") began to develop the 
Subdivision. At that time, they recorded a "Declaration 
of Protective Covenants" for the Subdivision. Soon 
afterwards, Dansie became aware of the planned Phase I 
development following the erection of a sign announcing 
the Subdivision's development. Dansie then met the 
developers in connection with negotiations for an 
agreement between them and Dansie's father to provide 
water to the Subdivision. Dansie also reviewed a sales 
brochure which indicated lot sizes and prices and 
described the Subdivision as a private community, 
accessible through an electronic gate. In early 1973, 
Lewton organized the Association, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, and filed a certificate of incorporation. 
According to the certificate of incorporation, the purpose 
of the Association was to provide for maintenance, 
upkeep and preservation of the [***3] streets, roads and 
common area within [the Subdivision] and also to ... 
promote the health, safety and welfare of the residents 
within [the Subdivision] and any additions thereto as 
may hereafter be brought within the jurisdiction of this 
Association.... 
BACKGROUND 
1999UT62,*;987P.2d30, **; 
1999 Utah LEXIS 98, ***; 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 
Page 2 
[**32] P4 In December 1973, Lewton and an entity 
described as "Hi-Country Estates Second" sold to 
Bagley, under a written contract, five forty-acre parcels 
of land adjacent to the Subdivision that included the 
Property. In this real estate contract (the "1973 
Contract"), Bagley received the right to use the 
Association's roads in the Subdivision for access to the 
property he was purchasing. In return, Bagley would 
become a member of the Association and pay a 
proportionate share of the costs of road maintenance and 
other services. Although the 1973 Contract's terms 
specifically bound Bagley's assigns and successors, it 
was not recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office. 
[*P5] 
In 1977, Bagley hired Dansie as a contractor to 
assist with the development and maintenance of the 
Subdivision's water system, by digging water lines, 
making connections, and repairing pumps. Acting in that 
capacity, Dansie aided in the placement and [***4] 
installation of a 40,000-gallon water tank on the westerly 
parcel in 1978. 
[*P6] Dansie acquired lots 51 and 43 within the 
Subdivision in 1984 and 1985, respectively. In 
November 1985, Bagley conveyed the westerly parcel to 
Dansie by warranty deed. Prior to that conveyance, 
however, Bagley had executed a trust deed in favor of 
United Bank, whose successor foreclosed on the westerly 
parcel in February 1989 (the "foreclosure") and later sold 
it to Fidelity National Insurance Company. With Dansie's 
aid, his in-laws, Paul G. and Ida F. Evans (the 
"Evanses"), purchased the westerly parcel at a public sale 
in March 1989. The Evanses ultimately conveyed the 
westerly parcel to Dansie in 1993 as part of a divorce 
settlement between Dansie and their daughter. In 1989, 
Bagley's attorney, Ralph Marsh, conveyed the easterly 
parcel to Dansie. None of the aforementioned deeds to 
the Property made any reference to any covenants, 
conditions, or restrictions on the property, nor did any 
appear in the Property's chain of title. 
[*P7] 
In 1986, prior to the foreclosure, Dansie conveyed 
the westerly parcel and lot 43 in the Subdivision to 
himself and his wife by a quit-claim deed to create a joint 
tenancy [***5] in the parcels. This quit-claim deed 
describes the property conveyed as: 
PARCEL ONE: 
The Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of 
Section 5, Township 4 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
PARCEL TWO: 
ALL OF Lot 43, HI-COUNTRY ESTATES, 
according to the official plat thereof on file in the Office 
of the Salt Lake County Recorder, State of Utah. 
TOGETHER WITH a right-of-way over and across 
and [sic] the private roads located within said 
subdivision. 
SUBJECT TO covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions on HI-COUNTRY ESTATES, as recorded in 
Book 3541, Page 68, Entry No. 2607748, Official 
Records, and the Rules and Regulations of the HI-
COUNTRY ESTATES Homeowner's Association. 
ALSO SUBJECT TO restrictions, rights of way, and 
easements appearing of record or enforceable in law and 
equity. 
[*P8] 
In 1990, the Association began sending the Evanses 
assessment notices for the westerly parcel. Dansie acted 
as their agent and attempted to ascertain the reason for 
the Association's attempted collection of assessments on 
a parcel outside the boundaries of the Subdivision. While 
the Association had previously assessed Dansie for lots 
43 and 51 in the Subdivision, and while he [***6] was 
aware of the specific breakdown of the Association's 
assessments, he had not received assessment notices on 
the westerly parcel at any time he had owned the parcel 
prior to the foreclosure. In November 1991, Backman-
Stewart Title Services, Ltd., paid the "1991 Association 
assessment, gate repair fee plus interest, penalties and 
fees" on Dansie's behalf, although the payment was made 
under Dansie's protest. 
[*P9] The Association continued in its attempts to 
collect fees and assessments on the Property from 
Dansie. In response to these repeated attempts, Dansie 
filed this declaratory judgment action against the 
Association, seeking a determination that he was entitled 
to an easement either by prescription and/or implication 
across the roads of the Subdivision, [**33] and that the 
Subdivision's covenants, conditions and restrictions 
("CC&Rs") and the Subdivision's "right to make such 
assessments [pursuant to the CC&RS] is limited as a 
matter of law against property located within the 
physical boundaries" of the Subdivision and not against 
the Property. The Association counterclaimed, seeking a 
judgment against Dansie for all unpaid assessments, 
interest on the assessments, and attorney [***7] fees, 
alleging that under the 1973 Contract, Dansie was a 
member of the Association and was therefore subject to 
the Subdivision's CC&Rs and was also subject to all 
corresponding fees and assessments. 
[*P10] At trial, the court dismissed with prejudice 
Dansie's claim for a prescriptive easement and for 
declaratory relief. Also, the court declared Dansie's claim 
Page 3 
1999 UT 62, *; 987 P.2d 30, **; 
1999 Utah LEXIS 98, ***; 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 
for an implied easement "effectively mooted by the 
judgment." On the counterclaim, the trial court 
determined: (1) The quit-claim deed unambiguously 
imposed both the Association's CC&Rs on the westerly 
parcel and Association membership on Dansie; (2) Both 
parcels were subject to the Association's CC&Rs by 
virtue of Dansie's actual notice of the CC&Rs; and (3) 
Dansie was thereby bound to pay all assessments and 
fees as required by Association membership. The court 
awarded the Association judgment for all past 
assessments and fees, including interest and attorney 
fees. Dansie now appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
[*P11] Dansie assigns as error the trial court's 
conclusions that (1) the quit-claim deed subjected the 
westerly parcel to the CC&Rs and imposed Association 
membership on Dansie; (2) Dansie had knowledge, 
either constructive or actual, [***8] of the CC&Rs, 
which subjected the Property to them even though they 
were not in the chain of title to the Property; and (3) the 
Association's by-laws (the "By-laws") required Dansie to 
pay the Association's attorney fees in this action. 
I. THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
[*P12] Dansie contends that the trial court erred in 
concluding that the quit-claim deed subjected the 
westerly parcel to the Subdivision's CC&Rs that had 
been imposed earlier on the Subdivision. As set out 
above, the deed conveyed two parcels of land. Parcel 
One was the westerly parcel. Parcel Two was lot 43, HI-
COUNTRY ESTATES, a lot in the Subdivision. 
Following the description of lot 43, there were three 
qualifying paragraphs as follows: 
TOGETHER WITH a right-of-way over and across and 
[sic] the private roads located within said subdivision. 
SUBJECT TO covenants, conditions, and restrictions on 
HI-COUNTRY ESTATES, as recorded in Book 3541, 
Page 68, Entry No. 2607748, Official Records, and the 
Rules and Regulations of the HI-COUNTRY ESTATES 
Homeowner's Association. 
ALSO SUBJECT TO restrictions, rights-of-way, and 
easements appearing of record or enforceable in law and 
equity. 
[*P13] The Association correctly [***9] 
characterizes the three qualifying paragraphs as the 
habendum clause of the deed whose purpose is to curtail, 
limit, or qualify the estate conveyed in the granting 
clause. See Haynes v. Hunt, 96 Utah 348, 353, 85 P.2d 
861 (1939). However, the issue in the instant case is 
whether this habendum clause qualifies both parcels or 
only Parcel Two. The trial court interpreted the 
"SUBJECT TO" and the "ALSO SUBJECT TO" 
paragraphs to apply to both Parcels One and Two. This 
was error for the following reasons. 
[*P14] First, the drafter of the deed clearly 
intended to deal with the two parcels separately as 
evidenced by labeling them "Parcel One" and "Parcel 
Two." All three of the qualifying paragraphs appear 
under the heading "PARCEL TWO," clearly indicating 
that they apply only to lot 43. They do not appear under 
the heading "PARCEL ONE." From the date of the 
Subdivision's creation, lot 43 was subject to the CC&Rs. 
Every succeeding conveyance of a Subdivision lot would 
have properly indicated that the lot was subject to the 
CC&Rs. However, Parcel One had not theretofore been 
subjected to the CC&Rs because it lay outside the 
Subdivision. The "Declaration of Protective Covenants" 
referred to [***10] in the deed expressly imposed the 
CC&Rs only on the Subdivision. [**34] We should not 
lightly assume that they could be also imposed on 
adjoining property such as Parcel One without a clear 
expression of intent by the owner to do so. That was not 
done here. "Restrictive covenants are not favored in the 
law and are strictly construed in favor of the free and 
unrestricted use of property." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. 
St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah 1991) 
(citing Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 
1982); Freeman v. Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339, 345, 423 P.2d 
155, 159 (1967); Parrish v. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419, 
421, 336 P.2d 122, 123 (1959)). 
[*P15] Second, if we determine that the 
"SUBJECT TO" and the "ALSO SUBJECT TO" 
paragraphs apply to Parcel One as the trial court did, then 
by the same reasoning we must conclude that the 
preceding qualifying paragraph reading "TOGETHER 
WITH a right of way over and across and [sic] the 
private roads located within said subdivision" must also 
apply to Parcel One. That reading would obviously be 
erroneous because it would amount to Dansie unilaterally 
granting to himself and his wife a right-of-way over the 
Subdivision's roads for [***H] the benefit of Parcel 
One without the consent of the Association that owned 
the roads. A right-of-way cannot be created in that 
manner. 
[*P16] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the 
trial court's conclusion that the quit-claim deed imposed 
the CC&Rs on the westerly parcel. 
II. ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF 
THE CC&Rs 
A. Notice 
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[*P17] Dansie next assigns as error the trial court's 
conclusion that the Property was subject to the 
Subdivision's CC&Rs because of Dansie's actual and 
constructive notice that it had been the Subdivision's 
developers' intention to impose the CC&Rs on any 
additional phases of the Subdivision, including the 
Property adjoining the Subdivision. The Association 
relies largely upon the 1973 Contract. In that contract, 
Bagley received the right to use the Association's roads 
in the Subdivision for access to the property he was 
purchasing. In return, the contract required Bagley to 
become a member of the Association and pay a 
proportionate share of the costs for road maintenance and 
other services. 
[*P18] The Association concedes that there is no 
document that specifically imposes the CC&Rs on the 
Property. The "Declaration of Protective Covenants," 
recorded [***12] in 1970 by the developers, specifically 
imposed the CC&Rs only on the Subdivision. While it 
may well have been the intent of the developers to 
impose the covenants on additional phases of the 
Subdivision which might be developed later, that was 
never done by a written instrument. Moreover, even if 
Dansie had notice or even knowledge of the developers' 
intent and knew of the obligation to subject the Property 
to the CC&Rs that the 1973 Contract imposed upon 
Bagley, Dansie was not a party to that contract, nor is it 
contended that he is a successor or assign of that contract 
so as to be bound by its terms. The Association cites no 
legal authority that would obligate Dansie to burden the 
Property with the CC&Rs simply because he had notice 
of the intent of the original developers and knowledge of 
the 1973 Contract. In neither of the deeds by which 
Dansie acquired title to the Property was there any 
attempt to burden the Property with the CC&Rs. Dansie 
acquired the Property free of all covenants, conditions, 
and restrictions. He cannot be bound by the intent of 
prior owners to subject the Property to the CC&Rs. 
B. Merger 
[*P19] There is an additional reason why the 
Property is not burdened [***13] by either a 
membership requirement or the associated CC&Rs. 
Dansie contends that even assuming the 1973 Contract 
did impose the CC&Rs, "the contract terms merged into 
subsequent deeds conveying the property and were 
therefore extinguished as a matter of law." The generally 
accepted rule dealing with merger supports Dansie's 
position "that on delivery and acceptance of a deed the 
provisions of the underlying contract for the conveyance 
are deemed extinguished or superseded by the deed." 
Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1986) 
(citations omitted). [**35] However, the Association 
correctly points out that there are exceptions to the 
application of merger. We agree that exceptions to this 
doctrine exist, "including fraud, mistake, and the 
existence of collateral rights in the contract of sale." 
Secor, 716 P. 2d at 793. The Association argues that the 
collateral rights exception applies in this case. We 
disagree with this argument. 
[*P20] If the original contract requires the seller to 
perform an act considered to be collateral to the 
conveyance of title, those obligations are not 
extinguished but instead survive the deed. Stubbs v. 
Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1977). In [***14] 
Stubbs, this court indicated that a determination of 
whether contract terms were either collateral or part of 
the obligation to convey title depended to a great extent 
on the intent of the parties. Id. There, we examined 
contract terms allowing a vendor to remove certain 
equipment and personal property from a building at a 
time after delivery of the deed. We determined that these 
contract terms were, in fact, collateral, stating; 
When seller's performance is intended by the parties to 
take place at some time after the delivery of the deed it 
cannot be said that it was contemplated by the parties 
that delivery of the deed would constitute full 
performance on the part of the seller, absent some 
manifest intent to the contrary. 
Id. at 169-70. The Association argues that under Stubbs 
the language of the 1973 Contract is not extinguished by 
the later deeds because the "1973 Contract requires the 
buyers to become members of the Homeowners 
Association at some point after the signing of the 
Contract ..., it contemplates performance after the 
delivery of the deed, and constitutes a collateral 
agreement." 
[*P21] However, nearly a decade after Stubbs, this 
[***15] court clarified the collateral rights standard, 
holding that "covenants relating to title and 
encumbrances are not considered to be collateral because 
they relate to the same subject matter as does the deed." 
Secor, 716P.2d 790, 793 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). 
The contract language relied on by the Association here 
is clearly a "covenant[] related to title and [an] 
encumbrance[]" upon the title to the Property. The 
CC&Rs burden the title. The 1973 Contract's language 
clearly intends membership in the /* 'v3" '^ ;\ o be 
required simultaneously with the pa^n^ o- ; ue u the 
Property. A duty to pay maintenance fees and other 
monetary assessments and to comply with the 
Subdivision's CC&Rs are fundamental elements of 
Association membership. Therefore, ii cf. < T said 
that this duty exists collateral to the title or d v. does 
not "relate to the same subject matter as does the deed." 
Id. Without express language imposing the membership 
requirement in the later deeds, the requirement in the 
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contract merged with the later deeds, and has thereby 
been extinguished. 
[*P22] In sum, Dansie's actual or constructive 
notice of the intent of his predecessor in title does 
[***16] not impose Association membership on him or 
the Subdivision's CC&Rs on the Property. 
III. IMPLIED EQUITABLE SERVITUDES 
[*P23] In the alternative, the Association contends 
that we can affirm the trial court's judgment under the 
theory of implied equitable servitude. The Association 
relies on a Maine case holding that an implied equitable 
servitude may be imposed where the evidence 
establishes: 
(1) a common owner subdivides property into a 
number of lots for sale; (2) the common owner has a 
"general scheme of development" for the property as a 
whole, in which the use of the property will be restricted; 
(3) the vast majority of subdivided lots contain restrictive 
covenants which reflect the general scheme; (4) the 
property against which application of an implied 
covenant is sought is part of the general scheme of 
development; and (5) the purchaser of the lot in question 
has notice, actual or constructive, of the restriction. 
3 W Partners v. Bridges, 651 A.2d 387, 389 (Me. 1994) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Chase v. Burr ell, 474 A. 2d 
180, 181 (Me. 1984)). 
[*P24] It is readily apparent that even the first 3W 
Partners' requirement cannot be [**36] met. The 
Property has never been [***17J subdivided nor offered 
for sale as individual lots. In Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 
54, 169 P.2d 781 (1946), we imposed a building 
restriction on the defendant's lot where the restriction 
appeared in ninety-five percent of the deeds to the 
subdivision's lots. There, the defendant had notice of the 
restriction that appeared in his chain of title. The instant 
case presents a far different fact situation. 
[*P25] It is a long-standing, well-accepted 
requirement that covenants are to be embodied in a 
written instrument bearing the covenantor's signature. 
See 9 Richard R. Powell on Real Property § 60.03 
(1998). Admittedly, there are certain instances where 
covenants can be imposed by implication, such as "from 
the language of a deed or lease or from the conduct of 
the parties." St. Benedict's Dev. Co., 811 P.2d at 198 
(citing 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions, and 
Restrictions § 173 (1965)). Those instances, however, 
are extreme, and, "as a general rule, ... not favored in the 
law." Id. (citing 20 Am. Jur. 2d § 12; Brown v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 359, 617 P.2d 704 (1980)). For 
such a covenant to be impliedly imposed on property, 
"the support for [***18] it must be 'plain and 
unmistakable' or it must be 'necessary' as a matter of 
law." Id. (quoting 20 Am. Jur. 2d § 173). 
[*P26] In the instant case, the Subdivision's 
developers placed the CC&Rs by written instrument on 
Phase I alone. The developers' written, signed, and 
recorded Protective Covenants expressly limit their 
application to "the described property," which is Phase I. 
Furthermore, while the Association's certificate of 
incorporation refers to "any additional property] as may 
hereafter be brought within the jurisdiction of the 
Association," the Property has never either been part of 
Phase I or been brought under the Association's purview. 
Therefore, if Association membership—with its 
corresponding fees, assessments, and CC&Rs-as is 
currently imposed upon Phase I lot owners is to be 
impliedly imposed upon the Property, it must be done in 
plain and unmistakable language. That has not been done 
here; thus, the Association's theory of implied equitable 
servitudes is not applicable here. 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES 
[*P27] The By-laws, after setting forth the 
assessments for which each member is responsible, 
dictate: 
If the assessment is not paid within thirty (30) days 
after the [***19] due date, ... the Association may bring 
an action at law against the owner personally obligated to 
pay the same or foreclose the lien against the property, 
and interest, costs, and reasonable attorney[] fees of any 
such action shall be added to the amount of such 
assessment. 
[*P28] As we have found that the Property is not 
subject to Association membership, the Association 
cannot recover from Dansie the attorney fees the By-
laws impose. While Dansie is a member of the 
Association by virtue of his ownership of two lots within 
the Subdivision, that cannot make him liable for attorney 
fees arising from a suit involving property outside of the 
Association's purview. 
[*P29] The judgment below is reversed and the 
case is remanded for determination of Dansie's claim of 
an easement across the Association's property. 
Associate Chief Justice Durham, Justice Stewart, 
Justice Zimmerman, and Justice Russon concur in Chief 
Justice Howe's opinion. 
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Rodney MARTIN, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Bernice SCHOLL, Executrix of George H. 
Chaffin Estate, and George H. Chaffin 
Investment Company, a Utah limited 
partnership, Defendants and Appel-
lants. 
No. 17542. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 14, 1983. 
Ranch laborer brought action for spe-
cific performance of oral contract for con-
veyance of 120 acres of land. The Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, Allen B. Sor-
ensen, J., entered judgment for laborer, 
and appeal was taken. The Supreme 
Court, Howe, J., held that ranch laborer's 
working long, hard hours for owner and 
declining other and better offers of employ-
ment elsewhere did not constitute exclu-
sively referable acts of reliance on owner's 
alleged oral agreement to convey 120 acres 
of land to laborer sufficient to take con-
tract out of statute of frauds where those 
acts were consonant with laborer's employ-
ment. 
Reversed. 
Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion 
in which Durham, J., concurred. 
1. Frauds, Statute of <£=>129(1) 
Ordinarily verbal gift of land or oral 
agreement to convey land is within statute 
of frauds; however, doctrine of part per-
formance allows court of equity to enforce 
oral agreement if it has been partially per-
formed, notwithstanding statute. U.C.A. 
1953, 25-5-8. 
2. Frauds, Statute of <e=>129(12) 
Ranch laborer's working long, hard 
hours for owner and declining other and 
better offers of employment elsewhere did 
not constitute exclusively referable acts of 
reliance on owner's alleged oral agreement 
to convey 120 acres of land to laborer suffi-
cient to take contract out of statute of 
frauds where those acts were consonant 
with laborer's employment. 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Clark R. Nielsen, 
John D. Russell, Salt Lake City, for defend-
ants and appellants. 
Gordon L. Roberts, Raymond J. Etchev-
erry, Kent 0. Roche, Salt Lake City, Dave 
McMullin, Payson, for plaintiff and respon-
dent. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Defendant George H. Chaffin Invest-
ment Company, a limited partnership, 
seeks reversal of a decree granting plain-
tiff Rodney Martin specific performance of 
an oral contract which the trial court found 
that the deceased George H. Chaffin had 
made to convey or devise to him certain 
real property in Genola, Utah County. 
Martin began working as a ranch laborer 
for Chaffin in 1936. He became foreman 
over all of Chaffin's farm and ranch prop-
erties in 1947 and continued in that capaci-
ty beyond Chaffin's death to January of 
1976. The Investment Company disputed 
but the trial court found that Chaffin in 
1947 had orally agreed to convey to Martin 
120 acres of land referred to as "the home 
place" if Martin would continue working as 
his foreman. Martin remained, receiving a 
salary and occasional raises. The trial 
court determined that he labored long and 
unusual hours and, with his wife, rendered 
personal services to Chaffin in reliance 
upon the contract. In 1968 Chaffin formed 
the Investment Company as part of his 
estate plan and conveyed certain real prop-
erty to it, including the 120 acre ranch. 
The trial court found that Martin had no 
notice of the conveyance and, further, that 
a gift of an interest in the Investment 
Company which Chaffin had made to Mar-
tin in 1969 was for his faithful service, 
unrelated to the 1947 agreement. The trial 
court held that Chaffin had breached the 
oral agreement when he died in 1975 with-
out having conveyed or devised the ranch 
to Martin. Consequently 
granted a decree of specific performance 
against the Investment Company which, as 
a constructive trustee, held the ranch for 
him. No cause of action was found against 
the executrix of the Chaffin estate. 
Our standard of review was stated in 
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 
Utah 2d 18, 23, 305 P.2d 480, 483 (1956): 
In an equity review of facts if the record 
shows a fair preponderance, or even if 
the evidence is balanced evenly, the trial 
court finding should be sustained. If the 
evidence is so vague and uncertain that 
the finding is obviously erroneous, there 
may be a new finding on review. 
[1] Ordinarily a verbal gift of land or 
an oral agreement to convey land is within 
the statute of frauds. However, the doc-
trine of part performance allows a court of 
equity to enforce an oral agreement, if it 
has been partially performed, notwith-
standing the statute. U.C.A., 1953, § 25-
5-8 of the Utah Statute of Frauds provides: 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall 
be construed to abridge the powers of 
courts to compel the specific perform-
ance of agreements in case of part per-
formance thereof. 
In the context of an elderly aunt's prom-
ise to devise property to her nephew, this 
Court outlined our standard of sufficient 
part performance: 
First, the oral contract and its terms 
must be clear and definite; second, the 
acts done in performance of the contract 
must be equally clear and definite; and 
third, the acts must be in reliance on the 
contract. Such acts in reliance must be 
such that a) they would not have been 
performed had the contract not existed, 
and b) the failure to perform on the part 
of the promisor would result in fraud on 
the performer who relied, since damages 
would be inadequate. Reliance may be 
made in innumerable ways, all of which 
could refer exclusively to the contract. 
This reliance provision is included to pre-
vent unfounded and fraudulent claims 
against a decedent's estate, which are 
inherent within such situations as this. 
MARTIN v. SCHOLL Utah 2 7 5 
Cite as 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983) 
Martin was Randall v. Tracy Collins & Trust Compa-
ny, supra, at 24, 305 P.2d at 484. In that 
case we held that the nephew's change of 
residence from Ogden to Provo in order to 
live near his aunt, to care for her and to 
manage her affairs met that standard. 
Professor Corbin states a similar standard: 
(1) The performance must be in pur-
suance of the contract and in reasonable 
reliance thereon . . . (2) The performance 
must be such that the remedy of restitu-
tion is not reasonably adequate . . . (3) 
The performance must be one that is in 
some degree evidential of the existence 
of a contract and not readily explainable 
on any other ground. 
2 Corbin on Contracts, § 425 (1950). An-
other statement of the rule explains: 
Part performance to be sufficient to take 
a case out of the statute must consist of 
clear, definite, and unequivocal acts of 
the party relying thereon, strictly refera-
ble to the contract, and of such character 
that it is impossible or impracticable to 
place the parties in status quo, mere 
nonaction being insufficient. 
37 C.J.S., Statute of Frauds, § 250 (1943). 
The critical observation to make in read-
ing these delineations of what constitutes 
sufficient part performance is that it must 
be proved by strong evidence. Whether 
phrased in "reliance" terminology where 
the evidentiary measurement is a substan-
tial change in position or worded in "per-
formance" language where the measure-
ment is whether the acts appear to be a 
result of the contract, or whether they are 
explainable on another ground, the strong, 
acts-oriented evidentiary standard is con-
stant. This acts-oriented rather than word-
oriented evidentiary requirement is consist-
ent with one of the worthwhile functions of 
the Statute of Frauds. It is: 
[to impose] a high evidentiary standard 
by which oral real estate contracts must 
be proved to qualify for a specific per-
formance. Equity has always demanded 
more conclusive proof of a contract be-
fore granting its "most perfect remedy" 
of specific performance . . . 
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'The Doctrine of Part Performance as Ap-
plied to Oral Land Contracts in Utah," 9 
Utah Law Review 91, 105 (1971). 
This Court in Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 
86 P. 767 (1906), reversed a judgment 
which had awarded land to a niece who had 
performed personal services for the de-
ceased and, with her husband, had moved 
onto his property. The judgment was re-
versed because the niece's use of the land 
and other acts for her uncle were insuffi-
cient evidence "that her status or relation 
had been so far altered that not to enforce 
a performance . . . inflict[ed] an unjust and 
unconscionable . . . loss to her She 
[showed] no such strong equities . . . as . . . 
are required to be shown independent of 
the parol gift or verbal contract." Id. at 
101, 86 P. at 772. Speaking of certain 
improvements the niece made to the land, 
this Court stated: 
[W]e are of the opinion that the improve-
ments are not of such value or character 
as to take the case out of the operation 
of the statute. Furthermore the evi-
dence does not satisfy us with that clear-
ness and persuasion required by the au-
thorities that they were made in conse-
quenc [sic] of a gift, or in pursuance of a 
promise to convey, or that they are other-
wise referable thereto. Indeed, there is 
little or no direct evidence proving such 
fact, nor is there any circumstance from 
which it may be reasonably inferred . . . 
[The improvements] . . . are as consistent 
with some interest in the premises less 
than a freehold as with an estate in free-
hold. 
Price v. Lloyd, Id. at 98, 86 P. at 770. 
This strong evidentiary standard had 
been observed in Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 
Utah 480, 33 P. 218 (1893). There, in re-
liance language, this Court held that the 
defendant's failure to fulfill the contract 
would work a fraud upon the rights of the 
plaintiff since she gave up plans of future 
independence to faithfully perform person-
al services of incalculable value for the 
defendant. Although the young woman's 
reliance was continued performance of ser-
vice rather than a substantial change in 
position, the evidentiary concern was satis-
fied since it was uncontested that the 
young woman's sacrifice of plans of future 
independence and continued service were a 
result of an actual contract. Crucially sig-
nificant was the fact that the existence of 
the contract had been admitted as true. 
Further: 
The agreement was distinct and certain 
as to what plaintiff should receive. 
There was no vague, uncertain, unde-
fined expectation of benefits to be de-
rived, but a distinct positive promise,— 
not to make plaintiff a gift, but in consid-
eration of certain services, to bestow 
upon her her entire property. 
Id. at 486, 33 P. at 220. Consequently, in 
Brinton, both equity and the statute of 
frauds' purpose of verifying an actual 
agreement were accomplished. 
Similarly, this Court maintained a high 
evidentiary standard in Van Natta v. Hey-
wood, 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192 (1920). We 
stated: 
[T]his class of cases should be scruti-
nized with particular care; and unless 
under the circumstances the proof is pos-
itive, clear, and convincing, the relief 
sought should, and will, be denied. 
Id. at 381, 195 P. at 194. Significantly, not 
only many friends' and neighbors' testimo-
ny but independent evidence supported the 
existence of an oral contract and the plain-
tiffs reliance upon it: 
[T]he plaintiff accepted the offer of the 
said Joseph McCullough [decedent], and 
entered into possession of all the proper-
ty of said estate, and at all times worked 
for the said Joseph McCullough until his 
death, without compensation, except 
when plaintiff was drafted into the Unit-
ed States army, during which time the 
said Joseph McCullough leased the prop-
erty belonging to his said estate subject 
to the condition that the said lease should 
be canceled upon the discharge and re-
turn of the plaintiff herein from the 
army; that upon the retirement of plain-
tiff from service in the army he returned 
to the said Joseph McCullough, and 
thereupon the lease was terminated, and 
MARTIN v. SCHOLL 
CiCe as 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983) 
Utah 277 
plaintiff again went into possession of 
the property of said estate, and contin-
ued to possess the same and care for and 
remain with the said Joseph McCullough, 
without compensation, until the death of 
said McCullough . . . 
Id. at 377, 195 P. at 192. 
As we have suggested, the greatest val-
ue of the requirement of exclusively refera-
ble acts of reliance is its evidentiary signifi-
cance. 
[A]cts of part performance must be ex-
clusively referable to the contract in that 
the possession of the party seeking spe-
cific performance and the improvements 
made by him must be reasonably explica-
ble only on the postulate that a contract 
exists [Citations omitted.] The reason 
for such requirement is that the equita-
ble doctrine of part performance is based 
on estoppel and unless the acts of part 
performance are exclusively referable to 
the contract, there is nothing to show 
that the plaintiff relied on it or changed 
his position to his prejudice . . . 
In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 44, 269 
P.2d 278, 281 (1954). 
In Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 
P.2d 570 (1953), quoting from the earlier 
Price v. Lloyd case, we remarked: 
" . . . In order that a plaintiff may be 
permitted to give evidence of a contract 
not in writing, and which is in the very 
teeth of the statute and a nullity at law, 
it is essential that he establish [in equi-
ty], by clear and positive proof, acts and 
things done in pursuance and on account 
thereof, exclusively referable thereto, 
and which take it out of the operation of 
the statute." 
Id. at 574, 260 P.2d at 578. In the next 
paragraph we quoted Justice Cardozo: 
"Equity . . . declines to act on words, 
though the legal remedy is imperfect, 
unless the words are confirmed and illu-
minated by deeds " 
Id. at 574, 260 P.2d at 578. The Ravarino 
case involved an inter vivos transfer rather 
than an instance of a promise to devise. 
The statute of frauds remained a bar be-
cause the promisee did not acquire posses-
sion of the property and the purchase of a 
strip of adjoining land was reasonably ex-
plainable on grounds other than the exist-
ence of an oral contract. 
As recently as in McDonald v. Barton 
Brothers Investment Corp., Utah, 631 
P.2d 851 (1981), another inter vivos trans-
fer of land case, we reaffirmed the require-
ment of exclusively referable acts of re-
liance. We articulated: 
If the acts relied on were not done in the 
execution of the oral contract but can be 
explained on another ground, they are 
insufficient to remove the bar of the 
statute of frauds and the contract is un-
enforceable. 
Id. at 853. See also Coleman v. Dillman, 
Utah, 624 P.2d 713 (1981); Holmgren 
Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, Utah, 534 P.2d 
611 (1975). Cf. Jackson v. Jackson, 122 
Utah 507, 252 P.2d 214 (1953) (where a 
property settlement agreement was an in-
sufficient memorandum of an oral contract 
to remove the contract from the statute 
and the promisee's raising of the children 
was a term she had agreed to in the proper-
ty settlement rather than an act exclusively 
referable to the oral contract). 
However, as the Brinton and Van Natta 
cases allude, where the contract is admitted 
or strong independent acts which prove the 
contract exists, the requirement of exclu-
sively referable acts has been relaxed. 
Therefore, in the case of In re Roth's Es-
tate, supra, we remanded with instructions 
to grant specific performance because even 
though it was possible to explain the taking 
possession and making of improvements on 
some other basis than that a contract exist-
ed, the promisor's own testimony estab-
lished an oral agreement on his part to sell 
his interest in the property to his brother. 
We explained the rule: 
[W]here the existence of the oral con-
tract is established by an admission of 
the party resisting specific performance 
or by competent evidence independent of 
the acts of part performance, the re-
quirement that the acts of part perform-
ance must be exclusively] referable to 
the oral contract is satisfied. . . . 
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Id. 2 Utah 2d at 45, 269 P.2d at 281. Like-
wise in Randall v. Tracy Collins & Trust 
Co., supra, 6 Utah 2d at 24, 305 P.2d at 484 
we expressed: 
If the contract has great clarity and defi-
niteness, there may be no need for re-
liance which is exclusively referable to 
the contract, so long as performance ful-
fills the terms. 
In light of its history in our cases, the 
requirement of exclusive referability is "an 
evidentiary requirement of equity that the 
facts speak for themselves." 9 Utah Law 
Review 91, supra, at 107. The requirement 
overcomes "the court's reluctance to pre-
vent the statute from operating on the 
basis of purely oral evidence." Id. at 106. 
As a corollary, where either independent 
acts which prove the contract can be found, 
or an admission of the contract is present, 
the requirement of exclusive referability 
may be relaxed because the evidentiary 
concern is assauged by either the admis-
sion or the independent acts. Consequent-
ly, the more conclusive the direct proof of 
the contract, the less stringent the require-
ment of exclusively referable acts. As Pro-
fessor Corbin puts it: 
If there is ample and convincing direct 
testimony less corroboration by circum-
stances is required. In most cases, such 
circumstantial corroboration is indispens-
able 
In great numbers of cases in which the 
part performance has been held insuffi-
cient on some ground or other and specif-
ic enforcement has been refused, the 
most compelling factor has been insuffi-
ciency of proof, the weakness often lying 
in the uncertainty and conflicting charac-
ter of the direct human testimony itself. 
2 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 442 at 528. 
[2] In the case at bar the court found 
evidence to support a contract between 
Martin and Chaffin which was based upon 
the testimony of Martin's witnesses: 
5. The Court finds that the terms of 
the oral contract between Martin and 
Chaffin are sufficiently supported by the 
testimony of the witnesses William Stan-
ley Bradford, Albert Nielsen, Bill Nielsen 
and Eddie Allen, all of whom have no 
interest in the outcome of this case, to 
meet the burden of persuasion required 
by Randall v. Tracy-Collins Trust Co., 
6 Utah 2d 18 [305 P.2d 480], and the 
Court therefore finds that the oral agree-
ment was entered into as alleged. 
The court also found that Martin relied 
upon the oral agreement: 
7. From the time Chaffin and Martin 
entered into their agreement in the 
spring of 1947 until Chaffin's death on 
July 30, 1975, Martin worked exclusively 
for Chaffin as his foreman in reliance 
upon their agreement that the subject 
property would be conveyed to Martin. 
In reliance on their agreement, Martin 
labored 10 to 16 hours per day, 7 days a 
week during the summer months and, 
occasionally when necessary, worked 
around the clock. In the winter time, 
Martin labored 8 to 10 hours per day, 7 
days a week. During this period of time 
Martin's salary ranged from $75 per 
month in 1947, to $375 per month in 
1975. From 1960 until 1969, Martin re-
ceived $325 per month without a single 
raise. Additionally, it is found that Rod-
ney Martin and his wife Martha, provided 
substantial personal services to Chaffin 
and that Martin's son Denny performed 
substantial labor with respect to the 
farming operations on Chaffin's farms 
and ranches for which he was not com-
pensated. It is further found that these 
services would not have been provided 
but for the agreement between Chaffin 
and Martin that the subject property was 
to be conveyed to Martin. 
The court concluded that Martin would not 
have continued to work for and provide 
personal services to Chaffin except for the 
agreement between them. 
We respect the court's findings and rec-
ognize the deference to be paid to the trial 
court who views first-hand the witnesses as 
they offer their testimony. We have no 
quarrel with his basic findings of the ex-
tent of services rendered by Martin to his 
employer. However, reviewing the court's 
application of our law to those findings, we 
MARTIN v. SCHOLL 
Cite as 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983) 
Utah 279 
can only conclude that the court erred in its 
holding that there was sufficient part per-
formance. The trial court drew one conclu-
sion from Martin's services but that is le-
gally insufficient since they admit of anoth-
er equally valid and consonant conclusion 
against his claim of contract. See Price v. 
Lloyd, supra. 
The fact that Martin worked for Chaffin 
as his foreman is not an exclusively refera-
ble act of reliance on the alleged oral 
agreement since it was consonant with 
Martin's employment. Martin's long 
hours, not atypical of a ranch foreman's 
life, were remunerated by salary. Martin's 
wife's driving Chaffin to various locations 
on occasion and asking him to stay for 
dinner when he was at the Martin house 
during mealtime were not inconsistent with 
good relations between an employer and an 
employee and his family. (At least once 
Mrs. Martin received compensation for her 
efforts). Further, Martin's son was com-
pensated for his labors from the time he 
reached the age of fourteen. (In arguing 
about the son's testimony, Martin's attor-
ney agreed 'The man has testified he got 
paid. I don't think there is any dispute 
about it") 
Martin's claim that he declined other and 
better offers of employment elsewhere to 
remain with Chaffin is also unavailing to 
prove reliance since, as we quoted earlier, 
mere nonaction is insufficient to constitute 
part performance. Professor Corbin con-
curs: 
If the performance rendered by the 
promisee consists wholly of forbearance 
to act, the fact is less likely to be eviden-
tial in character than when it consists of 
affirmative action. 
2 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 430 at 474. 
This claim of forbearance is at best highly 
equivocal as to Martin's motives. 
Of course, the fact that Martin continued 
to work long, hard hours for his employer 
might be viewed as sufficient reliance had 
there been an admission of an oral agree-
ment as in Brinton, supra, or independent 
acts pointing to such an agreement as in 
Van Natta, supra, where the promisor 
leased the property contingent upon the 
promisee's return from the army. How-
ever, the evidence of the oral contract in 
this case required the judge to weigh the 
credibility of Martin's witnesses against 
witnesses for the Investment Company 
who vigorously disputed the existence of 
an oral contract. Thus the necessity of 
showing acts of part performance which 
were exclusively referable to the claimed 
agreement remains vital. Yet with only 
the foundation of a finding of fact that a 
contract was made based upon disputed 
testimony that the ranch had been orally 
promised to him over 30 years ago, Martin 
contends (and the dissenting opinion advo-
cates) that the oral contract should be en-
forced. None of the case law we have 
discussed would permit it. In all of our 
cases either the requirement of acts of 
exclusive referability was met, or it was 
relaxed where there was no evidentiary 
concern regarding the existence of a con-
tract. Neither Martin's proof of the oral 
contract nor his acts in supposed reliance 
so comply. 
Even in Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust 
Co., supra, which is most similar to the 
case at bar, the nephew changed the loca-
tion of his home, and left his business to 
become an employee of his aunt's bank so 
that he could look after her business in 
reliance upon the oral contract. Moreover, 
he and his family changed lifestyles to pre-
pare meals and sit home with her at nights 
and on holidays. Martin and his family did 
not change locations, interrupted no life-
style and did no other acts that were not 
consonant with his job as ranch foreman. 
In Randall the contract and its terms were 
proved by clear, convincing and unequivo-
cal testimony. We found the evidence to 
be sufficient because as we quoted from 
the trial court's memorandum decision: 
"There is no direct evidence to dispute 
any of this testimony, and a careful ex-
amination of the transcript certainly 
would not justify a concept that the ef-
fectiveness of the testimony had been 
destroyed on cross examination." 
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Id, at 22, 305 P.2d at 483. However, the 
testimony of Martin's witnesses as to the 
existence of an oral contract was contro-
verted and a major point of dispute of the 
lawsuit.1 The trial courts finding of an 
oral contract must be followed by a finding 
of exclusively referable acts which Martin 
has failed to demonstrate. He and his fam-
ily's acts of labor, neighborliness and for-
bearance, as we have expressed, were en-
tirely consonant with his employment as 
ranch foreman. Even if we follow the 
standard advocated in the dissenting opin-
ion (which is mentioned in some of our 
cases and by Professor Corbin) that the 
acts of part performance need only be "not 
readily explainable" or "not reasonably ex-
plicable" on some other ground, our result 
would not be different. Martin's acts of 
claimed part performance of a vigorously 
disputed contract are so equivocal that they 
do not meet any of those high evidentiary 
standards. 
We have no quarrel with the argument in 
the dissenting opinion that the statute of 
frauds should not be used to perpetrate a 
fraud upon an innocent and unsuspecting 
person such as an employee who renders 
services in good faith upon a promised ex-
pectation. Such a rule would be easy to 
apply if there were some magical way of 
determining in each case whether in fact a 
contract had indeed been made. We could 
then apply the statute as a bar or refuse to 
apply it depending upon whether a contract 
was in fact made. There being no sure-
proof method of determining whether a 
contract was made, the Legislature has 
made it the policy in this state that oral 
contracts for the conveyance of land will 
not be enforced except where there is suffi-
cient part performance to provide a high 
evidentiary basis for their existence. This 
policy which the Legislature has translated 
into the statute of frauds may well result, 
in some cases, in the denial of a benefit to a 
well-deserving employee or servant. We 
are helpless to prevent that result where 
the evidence of part performance of the 
1. We find nothing in the record to indicate that 
the trial court found the existence of the con-
tract by clear and convincing evidence as stated 
claimed contract falls below the high evi-
dentiary standard required by courts of 
equity—regardless of the precise words 
which they may use in describing that stan-
dard. As unfortunate as it would be to 
deprive a man who had worked his life in 
reliance upon the expectation of receiving 
property, it would be equally serious to 
take property from an owner after his 
death (when he cannot be heard) on the 
strength of a questionable oral agreement 
supposedly made many years prior. If the 
statute of frauds is to be given any force, 
we cannot affirm the trial court. 
With the exception of Martin's interest in 
the Investment Company, the decree is re-
versed. Costs awarded to appellant. 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, J., concur. 
STEWART, Justice, dissenting: 
I respectfully submit that the majority 
assumes the role of a trial court on this 
appeal by, in effect, retrying the case on a 
critical evidentiary point and ignoring the 
trial court's findings of fact which contra-
dict the factual assumptions the majority 
makes. The consequence is that a man and 
his family who worked seme thirty years 
for the deceased George H. Chaffin is de-
prived of property which was promised to 
him in return for his services. In my view, 
the statute of frauds, which was designed 
to prevent frauds, in effect perpetrates on 
the plaintiff the very result which the stat-
ute was intended to avoid. 
I. 
Crucial to this decision is our standard of 
review in equity cases. In Jensen v. 
Brown, Utah, 639 P.2d 150 (1981), we 
recently addressed that standard because 
of numerous inconsistent rules as to our 
scope of review in equity cases. We reiter-
ated that "we reverse only when the trial 
court's finding is against the clear weight 
of the evidence." Id. at 152. See also 
McBride v. McBride, Utah, 581 P.2d 996 
in the dissenting opinion. However, this fact is 
of no consequence to our decision. 
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(1978); Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 
22 Utah 2d 143, 449 P.2d 989 (1969); Metro-
politan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 
2d 36, 376 P.2d 940 (1962). 
As the majority states, this Court in 
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 
Utah 2d 18, 23, 305 P.2d 480, 483 (1956), 
enunciated the standard of review in stat-
ute of frauds cases: 
In an equity review of facts if the 
record shows a fair preponderance, or 
even if the evidence is balanced evenly, 
the trial court findings should be sus-
tained. If the evidence is so vague and 
uncertain that the finding is obviously 
erroneous, there may be a new finding 
on review. Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 
520, 94 P.2d 465 [1939]; Morley v. Willd-
en, 120 Utah 423, 235 P.2d 500 [1951]; 
Perry v. McConkie, 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 
P.2d 852 [1953]; Youngren v. King, 1 
Utah 2d 386, 267 P.2d 913 [1954]. 
However, the majority does not hold that 
the evidence as to the existence of the 
contract or as to any element of the doc-
trine of part performance is "so vague and 
uncertain that the finding is obviously erro-
neous. " Id. Indeed, the Court does not 
hold that any of the findings are inade-
quately supported by the evidence. Rath-
er, on its own view of the evidence, the 
Court simply holds that the plaintiff's con-
duct was not exclusively referable to the 
oral contract, without even acknowledging 
that the trial court, in effect, held that it 
was exclusively referable on the basis of 
substantial evidence. 
II. 
The majority opinion is primarily devoted 
to establishing the proposition that in a 
part performance case the plaintiffs con-
duct relied upon to show part performance 
must refer "exclusively" to the contract. 
In Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 
supra, the case relied on by the trial court, 
this Court stated that the test for determin-
ing the necessary part performance is 
whether the plaintiff would not have per-
formed the acts of part performance but 
for the contract. The trial court in the 
instant case, relying upon Randall, stated 
in its findings of fact: "It is further found 
that these services would not have been 
provided but for the agreement between 
Chaffin and Martin that the subject proper-
ty was to be conveyed to Martin." This 
conclusion is based on the following de-
tailed findings of fact: 
1. Plaintiff Rodney Martin was em-
ployed by the defendant George H. Chaf-
fin in 1932 as a laborer at Chaffin's 
quarry located in Lemington, Utah. 
Martin continued to work for Chaffin in 
that capacity until the fall of 1936 when 
Martin left the quarry and began work 
as a ranch laborer for Chaffin on Chaf-
fin's farm and ranch properties located in 
both Genola and Payson, Utah. In 1938 
Martin was made a foreman with respect 
to all of Chaffin's farm and ranch proper-
ties located in Genola, Utah. In 1947, 
Martin became the foreman with respect 
to all of Chaffin's farming and ranch 
properties and continued in that capacity 
until Chaffin's death in 1975; and there-
after until January 1, 1976 for Chaffin's 
successor in interest. 
2. During the period of time that 
Martin worked for Chaffin, Chaffin 
owned a number of separate and distinct 
parcels of real property, each of which 
was referred to by a common name by 
Chaffin, his employees and residents of 
the community. The parcel which is the 
subject of this action consisting of 120 
acres located in Utah County, State of 
Utah, particularly described as 
The Northwest quarter of the North-
west quarter of Section 34, Township 9 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian and the East half of the 
Northwest quarter of Section 34 
was commonly referred to by the defend-
ant Chaffin, the plaintiff Martin, Chaf-
fin's employees and others in the commu-
nity as the home ranch, the home place, 
or simply the ranch. 
3. In the spring of 1947 Martin and 
Chaffin entered into an oral lease agree-
ment under the terms of which Chaffin 
agreed (a) to lease three of his parcels of 
real property (namely, the 120 acre home 
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ranch, which is the subject of this action, 
the Staley pasture, and the Nielsen place) 
to Martin (b) to stock the properties and 
(c) to provide the equipment necessary 
for farming operations. In consideration 
for this lease, Martin agreed to pay to 
Chaffin 50 percent of the profits which 
he derived from the operations on these 
three parcels of real estate. This oral 
lease was unilaterally terminated by 
Chaffin approximately four to six weeks 
after it was entered into. 
4. At the time Chaffin terminated the 
above-described oral lease, he requested 
that Martin remain in his employment 
and act as foreman for all of his farming 
and ranch operations. As inducement, 
Chaffin offered and promised that in the 
event Martin remained with him as his 
foreman, he would convey the 120 acres 
in Genola commonly known as the "home 
place" or "home ranch" to Martin at or 
before his (Chaffin's) death and would 
raise Martin's salary $25 per month. Af-
ter several days of deliberation and dis-
cussions with his wife, Martin accepted 
Chaffin's offer and immediately com-
menced performance under the terms of 
their agreement. 
5. The Court finds that the terms of 
the oral contract between Martin and 
Chaffin are sufficiently supported by the 
testimony of the witnesses William Stan-
ley Bradford, Albert Nielsen, Bill Nielsen 
and Eddie Allen, all of whom have no 
interest in the outcome of this case, to 
meet the burden of persuasion required 
by Randall v. Tracy-Collins Trust Co., 
6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480, and the Court 
therefore finds that the oral agreement 
was entered into as alleged. 
6. The Court further finds the agree-
ment sufficiently complete to support a 
decree of specific performance. 
7. From the time Chaffin and Martin 
entered into their agreement in the 
spring of 1947 until Chaffin's death on 
July 30, 1975, Martin worked exclusively 
for Chaffin as his foreman in reliance 
upon their agreement that the subject 
property would be conveyed to Martin. 
In reliance on their agreement, Martin 
labored 10 to 16 hours per day, 7 days a 
week during the summer months and, 
occasionally when necessary, worked 
around the clock. In the winter time, 
Martin labored 8 to 10 hours per day, 7 
days a week. During this period of time 
Martin's salary ranged from $75 per 
month in 1947, to $375 per month in 
1975. From 1960 until 1969, Martin re-
ceived $325 per month without a single 
raise. Additionally, it is found that Rod-
ney Martin and his wife Martha, provided 
substantial personal services to Chaffin 
and that Martin's son Denny performed 
substantial labor with respect to the 
farming operations on Chaffin's farms 
and ranches for which he was not com-
pensated. It is further found that these 
services would not have been provided 
but for the agreement between Chaffin 
and Martin that the subject property 
ivas to be conveyed to Martin. 
8. The Court finds that plaintiff com-
pleted his part of the bargain upon the 
death of George Chaffin. 
9. In 1975 Chaffin died without hav-
ing conveyed the subject property to 
Martin. [Emphasis added.] 
It seems to me that unless the Court can 
demonstrate that these findings are errone-
ous, it cannot reverse the trial court with-
out rewriting the standards of review 
which govern the relationship between this 
Court and the trial courts. 
What the majority position essentially 
boils down to, as best I understand it, is 
that a person who makes an oral contract 
with his employer for the conveyance of 
land cannot under any circumstances rely 
upon his continuation in employment to 
show part performance of the oral con-
tract. Perhaps that is an overstatement of 
the majority opinion; I certainly hope it is, 
but given the trial court's findings, and 
specifically the finding that "but for the 
agreement between Chaffin and Martin 
that the subject property was to be con-
veyed to Martin," Martin would not have 
performed the services which he did, I see 
no other alternative. 
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The plaintiff claims that he worked ten 
to sixteen hours per day, seven days a 
week, for nearly thirty years and that the 
reasonable value of his thirty years of 
work as a farm manager was shown to be 
approximately $400,000. The defendants, 
of course, denied these allegations, but it is 
significant that the trial court declined to 
make a finding, proposed by the defend-
ants, that plaintiffs salary was consistent-
ly higher than the average salary paid to 
farm workers in Utah during the entire 
period of his employment. 
I submit that the trial court's finding 
that the extraordinary services performed 
by the plaintiff and his family "would not 
have been provided but for the agreement 
between Chaffin and Martin that the sub-
ject property was to be conveyed to Mar-
tin" is simply another way of phrasing the 
majority's "exclusively referable" standard 
in cases of this type where an employee is 
induced to stay on working for another on 
the strength of a promise of a future con-
veyance. The test employed by the trial 
court is a stringent test—stringent enough 
to meet the basic policy underlying excep-
tions to the statute of frauds. It is a test 
that would avoid fraud and is also appropri-
ate in light of the fact that a plaintiff in 
such circumstances as the instant is not 
likely to be able to show much stronger 
proof of part performance or substantial 
reliance than was shown here. Moreover, 
the "but for" test rests squarely on the 
authority of Randall v. Tracy Collins 
Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 24, 305 P.2d 480, 
484 (1956). 
III. 
The majority concedes that although the 
"exclusively referable" doctrine is some-
times made an element of the part perform-
ance doctrine, as it is generally phrased, it 
need not be so if evidence is strong enough 
that an oral contract for the conveyance of 
land was entered into. 
The "exclusively referable" doctrine is a 
special application of a generally broader 
1. The majority quotes the same passage in its 
opinion, but it also quotes a far more strict 
678 P.2d—8 
and less stringent rule for sufficient part 
performance. Professor Corbin states the 
general rule as follows: 
(1) The performance must be in pur-
suance of the contract and in reasona-
ble reliance thereon (2) The per-
formance must be such that the remedy 
of restitution is not reasonably adequate 
(3) The performance must be one 
that is in some degree evidential of the 
existence of a contract and not readily 
explainable on any other ground. 
2 Corbin on Contracts § 425 (1950) (em-
phasis added).1 
The third element of the rule of part 
performance as stated by Corbin does not 
require that the performance be "exclusive-
ly referable" to the contract, only that it be 
"in some degree evidential" of the con-
tract's existence and "not readily explaina-
ble on any other ground." This standard, 
which is clearly lower than the "exclusively 
referable" test, has been previously articu-
lated by this Court. E.g., Ravarino v. 
Price, 123 Utah 559, 575, 260 P.2d 570, 578 
(1953) (part performance must be "clearly 
referable" to contract). 
The rationale behind the "clearly refera-
ble standard" is that often evidence of the 
contract is not adequately proved by evi-
dence independent of the part performance, 
and part performance in such circumstanc-
es acts as additional proof of the contract 
"[T]he part performance must be clearly 
evidential of the existence of a contract—it 
must be such as would not ordinarily have 
taken place in the absence of a contract 
and therefore is not reasonably explicable 
on some other grounds." 2 Corbin on 
Contracts, supra, § 430 at 473. 
However, where the existence of the con-
tract is clearly shown by independent evi-
dence, this standard is relaxed. Thus, Cor-
bin states: 
It has been held in a well reasoned 
case that the performance rendered by 
the plaintiff need not be such as to be 
referable to the contract in the sense 
statement of the standard from C.J.S., Statute of 
Frauds, § 250, which it seems to follow. 
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that it is clearly evidential that the al-
leged contract was made, if the defend-
ant admits the making of such a contract 
but differs as to a part of its terms. The 
admission itself relates the performance 
to the contract and makes unnecessary 
any other proof of the terms so far as 
they are admitted. 
2 Cor bin on Contracts, supra, § 430 at 
475. 
By its rigid application of the "exclusive-
ly referable test/ ' the majority raises the 
standard of proof in cases such as the 
instant case to a level that is unnecessarily 
high. In cases where the existence of the 
contract has already been proved by inde-
pendent evidence, as in the instant case, 
the exclusively referable test in effect re-
quires that the plaintiff "reprove" the ex-
istence of the contract by part perform-
ance. Even when the proof of the exist-
ence of the contract is somewhat in doubt, 
the majority requires corroboration by a 
standard much stricter than the one Corbin 
suggests. Concededly, where there is no 
other evidence of the contract, the "exclu-
sively referable" test is an appropriate test. 
However, in this case there is other evi-
dence of the contract. 
Utah cases are in accord with the princi-
ple stated by Corbin. In In re Roth's Es-
tate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P.2d 278 (1954), the 
seller in an oral contract to convey land 
contended that because certain improve-
ments to property by the buyer were not 
"exclusively referable" to the contract, the 
contract should not be enforced. We held 
that because the seller's own testimony 
established that an oral contract existed, 
the exclusively referable rule did not apply, 
even though "it might be possible to ex-
plain the taking of possession and the mak-
ing of improvements on some other basis 
than that a contract existed." Id. at 44, 
269 P.2d at 281. We cited with approval 
holdings from other jurisdictions that 
where the existence of the oral contract 
is established by an admission of the 
party resisting specific performance or 
by competent evidence independent of 
the acts of part performance, the re-
quirement that the acts of part perform-
ance must be exclusively] referable to 
the oral contract is satisfied. 
Id. (emphasis added), citing Jones v. Jones, 
333 Mo. 478, 63 S.W.2d 146 (1933); Higgins 
v. Exchange Nat. Bank, 142 Misc. 69, 253 
N.Y.S. 859 (1931). Similarly, in Randall v. 
Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 24, 
305 P.2d 480, 484 (1956), we stated: 
If the contract has great clarity and 
definiteness, there may be no need for 
reliance which is exclusively referable to 
the contract, so long as performance ful-
fills the terms. 
Accord Van Natta v. Heywood, 57 Utah 
376, 195 P. 192 (1920); Brinton v. Van 
Cott, 8 Utah 480, 33 P. 218 (1893). 
Of the cases cited by the majority which 
are apparently to the contrary, two are 
distinguishable. In Holmgren Brothers 
Inc. v. Ballard, Utah, 534 P.2d 611 (1975), 
the issue was not whether the part per-
formance was exclusively referable, but 
whether a contract existed at all. Al-
though the evidence showed that an oral 
contract to convey land had originally exist-
ed, the buyer later repudiated the contract 
by refusing to accept the proferred convey-
ance. We held that the buyer's weeding 
and discing of the land was not sufficient 
evidence to prove the contract. Jackson v. 
Jackson, 122 Utah 507, 252 P.2d 214 (1953), 
is also distinguishable on the ground that 
the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of 
an oral contract to make a will. 
The only cases actually to the contrary 
are McDonald v. Barton Brothers Invest-
ment Corp., Utah, 631 P.2d 851 (1981); 
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 
570 (1953); and Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 
86 P. 767 (1906). The rule in those cases is 
that even where the existence of an oral 
contract is clearly and convincingly proved 
by evidence independent of the part per-
formance, the part performance must be 
shown to be exclusively referable to the 
contract. The rationale is that the part 
performance doctrine is essentially one of 
estoppel, Ravarino v. Price, supra, 123 
Utah at 567, 260 P.2d at 574, and that the 
referability of the past performance must 
MARTIN v. SCHOLL 
CUe as 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983) 
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be shown in order to establish the requisite 
reliance on the contract. In re Roth's Es-
tate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 44, 269 P.2d 278, 281 
(1954). I submit that such an emphasis on 
estoppel is misplaced and that it should be 
weighed along with other pertinent factors. 
If these cases are followed, even when 
significant substantial part performance 
has been rendered, the door is open for a 
defendant to deny a valid oral contract 
simply because he is able to conjure up a 
motive for the plaintiffs performance that 
is not exclusively referable to the contract. 
As Corbin states in the section entitled 
"Oral Contracts to Transfer Land in Re-
turn for Services": 
Where the making of the oral contract is 
proved beyond any reasonable doubt, and 
where the services have been long[,] con-
tinued, onerous, and of a kind incapable 
of just estimation in money, the chancel-
lor's conscience will be so moved as to 
lead to the conclusion that it is a "virtual 
fraud" for the defendant to hide behind 
the statute. 
2 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 435 at 
498. 
The rule should be that if clear and con-
vincing evidence proves the existence of 
the contract, then it is sufficient for the 
plaintiff to show that the part performance 
is "clearly referable" to the contract, i.e., 
was clearly in reliance on the contract or in 
accordance with the terms of the contract. 
The opposing party should then have the 
burden of proving alternate explanations, if 
any exist, for the part performance. In 
fact, defendants in the instant case at-
tempted to do this, and the trial court re-
fused to find in their favor. 
The majority concedes that "the more 
conclusive the direct proof of the contract, 
the less stringent the requirement of exclu-
sively referrable acts." It then quotes 
with approval Corbin's statement that "[i]f 
there is ample and convincing direct tes-
timony [then] less corroboration by cir-
cumstances is required." Even by the ma-
2. The majority states in footnote 1 that "[w]e 
find nothing in the record to indicate that the 
trial court found the existence of the contract by 
jority's own standard, then, the question 
here is whether the testimony was suffi-
ciently "ample and direct" to prove, clearly 
and convincingly, that Chaffin contracted 
with the plaintiff to give him the "home 
place" when Chaffin died if the plaintiff 
would stay on as Chaffin's foreman. 
The trial court was persuaded that the 
independent testimony of four disinterested 
witnesses proved the existence of such an 
oral contract between Martin and Chaffin. 
(See the trial court's finding of fact number 
five, quoted above.) William Bradford, a 
former employee of Chaffin, testified that 
in 1955 "[Chaffin] told me that if Rod 
stayed with him (Chaffin) he was going to 
get the Genola Home Place." Bradford 
had two other conversations with Chaffin, 
one in the late 1940's and one in 1965, 
which confirmed Chaffin's intent to leave 
the land in question to the plaintiff. 
Albert Nielsen, a neighbor, testified that 
about six months before Chaffin died Niel-
sen asked to purchase ten acres of the land 
in question. Chaffin refused because when 
he died "[the land] belonged to Rod Mar-
tin." 
Bill Nielsen, the son of AJbert and also a 
neighbor, asked Chaffin in about 1970 or 
1971 if he could buy some ground. Nielsen 
testified "[Chaffin] said he couldn't sell it 
because it was promised to Rod." This 
was confirmed by an earlier conversation 
between Bill Nielsen and Chaffin one sum-
mer when Bill had been an employee. 
Finally, Eddie Allen, another former em-
ployee, testified that in about 1957 Chaffin 
had said that Martin "will get this place 
some day." 
The trial court, on the basis of what I 
think is clear and convincing evidence, 
found that the contract alleged by plaintiff 
in fact existed. The majority discounts 
that finding and the supporting testimony 
and rules in effect that the evidence was 
not sufficiently clear and direct to establish 
the disputed contract.2 It states that "the 
clear and convincing evidence as stated in the 
dissenting opinion." The trial court did not 
invoke that phrase, but the testimony of the 
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existence of the oral contract was contro-
verted and a major point of dispute in the 
lawsuit." It also implies in quoting from 
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co. that 
the above-summarized testimony was dis-
puted by direct evidence, and that its effec-
tiveness was "destroyed on cross-examina-
tion." 
On the contrary, the record shows that 
the defendant did not destroy the testimo-
ny of plaintiffs witnesses by cross-exami-
nation, and the trial court impliedly so 
found. Thus, what the majority does is 
retry this case by reweighing the credibili-
ty of the witnesses. That is not the pre-
rogative of this Court, irrespective of the 
fact that this is an action in equity. 
Although I recognize that Chaffin (i.e., 
the deceased) performed acts on occasion 
which were not necessarily consistent with 
the existence of the contract conveying the 
property to plaintiff, I submit, on the other 
hand, that neither were those acts neces-
sarily inconsistent with the existence of the 
contract. In any event, given the existence 
of the contract, Chaffin's subsequent con-
duct did not have the effect of either vitiat-
ing it or proving that it did not exist. 
What is critical, and is clear in the record, 
is that the plaintiff devoted his whole life 
to maintaining the deceased's farm as if it 
were the plaintiffs own farm. The trial 
court's finding that plaintiff would not 
have spent "his lifetime as he did but for" 
the existence of the contract should be 
dispositive. 
I respectfully submit that the doctrine of 
part performance in this case has been 
construed so narrowly that it has failed to 
achieve its intended purpose of avoiding 
application of the statute of frauds with 
such rigor as to produce the very kind of 
fraud that the statute was intended to pre-
vent. 
DURHAM, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of STEWART, J. 
witnesses referred to in Finding of Fact No. 5r 
quoted above in its entirety, was not controvert-
ed and, together with the conceded acts of the 
AUTO WEST, INC., Charles Bryan, Paul 
Graff and Norman P. Stephens, Plain-
tiffs, Counter-defendants, Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents, 
v. 
Richard BAGGS, Defendant, Counter-
claimant, Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant. 
No. 17984. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 23, 1984. 
Auto dealership and shareholders com-
menced action against another shareholder, 
who was also general manager, seeking 
termination of proxies held by defendant, 
accounting, and return of all moneys im-
properly taken from dealership. Defend-
ant filed answer and counterclaimed 
alleging slander. After bench trial, the 
Fifth District Court, Iron County, Robert 
F. Owens, J., awarded plaintiffs $6,334.12 
in damages, and awarded defendant $25,-
000 damages for slander, and appeals were 
taken. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., 
held that: (1) circuit court judge was prop-
erly appointed to sit as district court judge; 
(2) protection of interests of all parties in 
maintaining dealership franchise was suffi-
cient to support irrevocability of proxies 
given to defendant; (3) proxies terminated 
by operation of law; and (4) evidence was 
sufficient to support finding that defendant 
was slandered. 
Affirmed. 
Hall, C.J., filed opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, in which Howe 
and Durham, JJ., joined. 
1. Judges <£=>3 
Where appointment of circuit judge 
was not pursuant to statute governing ap-
plaintiff, consisted of evidence that clearly 
meets that standard. 
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So, your intention was to sell the water with the lots, as 
you said in your affidavit? 
A No, we did not sell it with the lots. 
Q You're saying that the affidavit --
A I mean --
Q The affidavit is false? 
A Now, ask -- please ask that question again. 
Q You're saying in your affidavit you signed in 1988 
that you sold lots, or you subdivided and platted the Rocky 
Top Subdivision, with the intent of selling platted lots with 
water developed from your interest in the Rose Spring. 
That's what you said in 1988. Is that true or false? 
A I still don't quite understand. That we sold the 
water with the lots? 
Q That you developed -- you subdivided and platted 
Rocky Top Subdivision with the intent of selling platted lots 
with water developed from the Rose Spring. Is that true, as 
you said in 1988? 
A "We would sell them water rights, but we didn't sell 
the water with the lots. 
Q So it's your testimony today that what you said in 
19 88 was wrong? 
A I suppose I'm perjured. 
THE COURT: What's the objection? 
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MS. DRAGOO: The objection is it mischaracterized 
the testimony. 
THE COURT: If she doesn't understand the question, 
she can say she can't answer it. The objection is overruled 
on mischaracterization. 
Q (BY MR. RAMPTON) Do you understand my question? 
A No, I don't. 
Q And I want to make sure that you are clear on this 
point. In 1988, you said, under oath, that you subdivided 
and platted the Rocky Top Subdivision with the intent of 
selling platted lots with water developed from your interest 
in the Rose Spring. That's what you said in 1988. Was that 
true? 
A If it's got it here, in 1988 we was still in court 
with Bleazards. That's when he said, "leave it alone or I'll 
have you in court." I'm seventy years old. I don't 
understand like you guys. 
Q Well, I'm --
A But we were still in court with Bleazard in 19 88, so 
it I'm -- if I've made a mistake, I did. 
Q Let's go on to Paragraph 9 in the affidavit, 
Mrs. Warr. You have already testified that, at the time that 
you signed this affidavit, you sold six lots; Spears, Teresa, 
Brenda, Howard, Wayne Reynolds, and the Crittendens' lots to 
them. 
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A 
'
 Q 
quote: 
Yes. 
They•re - - this affidavit, in Paragraph 9, you say, 
We have sold six of the eleven lots in the Rocky Top 
Subdivision upon our representation that gravity 
flow irrigation water would be provided to such 
lots from our interest in the Rose Spring. 
Period, end quote. Is that what you said in 1988? 
A Well, that was our intention: If we had the water, 
they would have it. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. You 
subsequently got the water. How did your intention change 
after you got the water? 
A This was in 1984? 
THE COURT: No, this is was made in 1988. 
THE WITNESS: No, we was --we didn't settle with 
Bleazard until 1990. 
THE COURT: You settled with Bleazard in 1990. Did 
your intent change in any respect, or what you had said in 
this affidavit? 
THE WITNESS: If we got the water, got it down here, 
that the plaintiffs were always told that they would have 
their irrigation water, but it would not be free. 
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TabD 
the well -- or, is the allocation of 40 percent, 
THE WITNESS: That's right. We did not know what 
the flow was. We did not quantify that. We were aware it 
was less than four second feet. 
THE COURT: Right. But there's a benefit to the 
property owners to convert it into their well because they 
can draw more total water out. 
THE WITNESS: That's right. 
Q (BY MS. DRAGOO) Turning to Exhibit 78, do you 
have that in your book? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q All right. What is that exhibit? 
A This is a copy of the list of names that Hazel gave 
me for whom to prepare quit claim deeds. 
Q Was this 1993? 
A I believe so. 
Q If you would refer to Exhibit 92. This deed refers 
to 7.5 percent. 
A Yes, it does. 
Q How did this come about? 
A After I had prepared the first round, the quit claim 
deeds, I believe Hazel and Clayton made some effort to convey 
those. 
I made it a point to avoid getting involved in the 
commercial terms of that. They came back to me about a year 
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later and asked me to prepare some more deeds, I think 
because they had new names, either through lot sales or 
something along those lines• 
I had had the time to think about the issue a little 
bit, and suggested that rather than giving enough water to 
irrigate an entire five acres, when it came time to prove 
beneficial use, we would probably lose some of that right 
through the construction of paved and unirrigated areas on 
the lots; driveways, road way, barns, corrals, house. 
And I proposed preserving as much of the water right 
as we could, and cut back the amount of water being conveyed 
by these deeds to .75. This would be enough to irrigate 
four-and-a-half acres. 
Combined with the quarter-acre with domestic water 
right would be four and three-quarters acres irrigated area 
on a five-acre lot. 
The balance would not have irrigation rights to it, 
but would probably be occupied by unirrigated areas anyway. 
Q Have you done any further testing of flows of the 
spring? 
A No, I have not. 
Q And will -- once you prepared those quit claim deeds 
in "94 from 7.5 percent, did you then prepare quit claim 
deeds for several other owners besides the exhibit that we've 
mentioned? 
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A I believe there were several quit claim deeds at 
that time; I don't recall who or how many. 
Q Would you turn to Exhibit 80? 
THE COURT: You have proved up the amount of use 
that's being done on the Howard property after, with this 
higher draw? 
THE WITNESS: No, only for his domestic water right. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: No proof would be called for until 
after he had an approved application. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q Did you prepare this quit claim deed to Melvin 
Spears? 
A It looks like one that I prepared, yes. 
Q And that's the same type of quit claim deed you 
prepared in '94? 
A This was ours, of 1993 issue. 
Q Right. Did you also prepare a change application 
based on these quit claim deeds? 
A In my deposition I denied remembering such, but 
after the deposition, I went through my personal files on 
these matters. I went through those files step by step, and 
found that I had a draft for a change application. 
I also had a plot report showing the water users in 
the vicinity, which would have probably been reference 
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